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V

REPLY ARGUMENT

Western States' response brief contains a hodgepodge of unpersuasive
assertions that are notable for their inaccuracies, inconsistencies, and
concessions. The Fullers will reply appropriately. Although the response
briefing ignores the conditional nature of the Fullers' appeal points, this brief
will reply to the arguments in the order Western States discusses them. On any
or all grounds, this Court should reverse and remand for entry of an amended
judgment using the legally correct interest rate.

I.

THE LEGAL RATE FOR PREJUDGMENT INTEREST OF 10%
APPLIES TO THE TORT CLAIMS IN THIS CASE.

Western States suggests the district court did not abuse its discretion in
rejecting the legal rate in Utah Code Ann.§ 15-1-1(2) (2013). (Aplee. Br. at 7.)
Abuse of discretion is not the proper standard of review if the Court reaches this
issue. Rather, the proper rate to apply is a legal question reviewed for
correctness. See Francis v. National DME, 2015 UT App 119,, 21,350 P.3d 615.
A.

The Plain-Language Construction of the Statute Applies the Legal
Rate to "Any" Cause of Action, Not Only Those That Are the
Subject of a Contract.

The parties are in agreement that Section 15-1-1(2) should be construed
according to its plain language. Western States' proffered construction,
however, eschews plain language in favor of limiting language that does not
appear within the governing provision. While the legal rate in subsection (2) on

its face applies to any chose in action, Western States reads it to apply only to
choses in action that are the subject of a contract.
Subsections (1) and (2) of Section 15-1-1 provide:

(1) The parties to a lawful contract may agree upon any rate of interest for
the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action that is
the subject of their contract.
(2) Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest,
the legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money,
goods, or chose in action shall be 10% per annum.
These two subsections address different but related concepts. Subsection

(1) provides that parties may enter into a contract agreeing to an interest rate
between themselves for the loan or forbearance of any 1noney, goods, or choses
in action addressed in their contract. Subsection (2), in contrast, provides that
unless there is a contract to the contrary, the legal rate will be 10% for the loan or
forbearance of any money, goods, or choses in action. Only by lifting language
out of subsection (1) and imposing it upon subsection (2) can Western States'
proffered consh uction be realized. This would do violence to the statute,
4

however, as the Legislature is presumed to choose its wording advisedly. See

Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P'ship, 2011 UT 50,114,267 P.3d 863.
Here is how Western States would have subsection (2) read:
Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest, the
legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or
chose in action [that is the subject of their contract] shall be 10% per
annum.

2

The fact the underlined words appear in subsection (1) but not subsection (2) is
a distinction with a difference, as the language of subsection (1) is conclusive
evidence that the Legislature knew how to use such limiting language if that
was the result it intended. See Marion Energy, 2011 UT 50,114 (appellate courts
"seek to give effect to omissions in statutory language by presuming all
omissions to be purposeful"). Moreover, Western States' reading of the statute,
implying a phrase that is expressly omitted, is not a natural or persuasive
construction. See Saleh v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2006 UT 20, 1 17, 133 P.3d 428 (only
plausible, reasonable readings need be considered).
Western States' reading of subsection (2) is that "[i]t only governs
contracts addressing loans, forebearance [sic], or chose [sic] in action." (Aplee.
Br. at 9.) Western States suggests an example of a contract addressing a chose in
action is found in Time Finance Corp. v. Johnson Trucking Co., 458 P.2d 873 (Utah
1969). That case involved an assignment of a claim from one entity to another.
Western States does not explain how interest could ever accrue on such a
contract. Moreover, Western States' description of the Time Finance assignment
as a "chose in action which is the subject of a contract" (Aplee. Br. at 9) partakes
of the very nature of its own criticism: it ignores the statutory link to the word
"forbearance" and adds words not actually found in subsection (2).
The Fullers' approach- which is the one sanctioned by long usage in the
courts - better implements the plain language of subsection (2). A "chose in
3

action" is "[a] proprietary right in personam, such as a debt owed by another
person, a share in a joint-stock company, or a claim for damages in tort." Black's

•

Law Dictionary 294 (10 th ed. 2009) (emphasis added). It is synonymous with
"thing in action," which is the term used in the Utah statutes until 1985. See id.;
Addend. Ex. 9, at 16.1
"Forbearance" means" [t]he act of tolerating or abstaining," or "[t]he act
of refraining from enforcing a right, obligation, or debt." Black's Law Dictionary
760 (10 th ed. 2009). It is "a refraining from the enforcement of something (as a
debt, right, or obligation) that is due" or "the act of forbearing: patience."
http://www.merriam-webster.com/ dictionary/ forbearance.
What, then, is "forbearance" of" any ... chose in action" or, for that
matter, of" money"? It is this case: the Fullers did not receive money to which
they were entitled, because of the defendants' wrongful conduct, and so sued in
tort to recover it. The Fullers' judgment on their chose in action, received eight
years after the money should have been paid, was the very type of
"forbearance" contemplated by the statute, as recognized by case law from both
the Supreme Court and this Court. See, e.g., Iron Head Constr. Inc. v. Gurney, 2009
UT 25, ,I 10,207 P.3d 1231 ("[A]n award of prejudgment interest simply serves
to compensate a party for the depreciating value of the amount owed over time

'The word "chose," as used here, derives from the French and means "[a] thing,
whether tangible or intangible." Black's Law Dictionary 294 (10 th ed. 2009).
4

•

and, as a corollary, deters parties from intentionally withholding an amount that
is liquidated and owing.") (quotations and citation omitted); Kraatz v. Heritage

Imps., 2003 UT App 201, ,r 75, 71 P.3d 188 ("Plaintiffs are entitled to damages for
the loss of use of the money that, but for the [defendant]'s breach and ensuing
delay, would have been paid to plaintiffs in satisfaction of their ... claim.");

Sundial Inc. v. Villages at Wolf Hollow Condo. Homeowner's Ass'n, Inc., 2013 UT

•

App 223, ,r 8, 310 P.3d 1233 (reading statute to apply legal rate to recovery on a
non-contract cause of action).
Lastly, if Western States' reading were to be adopted by this Court, the

•

judgment should still be reversed and an amended judgment entered in favor of
the Fullers on this record. Under Western States' reading, subsection (2)

•

provides a 10% legal rate for interest when parties have contracted with respect
to a chose in action but have not specified an interest rate. Here, the district
court concluded that the parties stipulated to an award of prejudgment interest
for the Fullers' breach of agency duty and negligent misrepresentation claims
against Western States. (R. 1973, at 12.) That stipulation constitutes a valid
contract. According to Western States, the parties' contract did not include an
agreement on the rate. Therefore, under Western States' proffered reading of the
statute, the Court is required to impose a 10% rate because a chose in action was
the "subject of their contract."
The plain-language reading of Section 15-1-1(2) favors the Fullers.
5

B.

The Statutory HistQry of Section 15-1-1(2) Supports the Continued
Reading of the Statute to Follow the Rule from Fell and Uinta
Pipeline in Tort Cases.

There is no principled distinction to be made between the historical
versions of the prejudgment interest statute. The Fullers submitted the statutes
from 1898 to the present so the Court could see the continual thread of statutory
law that matches the continual thread of case law during that same period.
(Addend. Ex. 9.) Except for the Wilcox/Consolidated Coal language discussed in
this appellate briefing, Utah case law has consistently read these statutes the
same way. That is because they are substantively the same.
Like the current statute, the 1898 version at issue in Fell v. Union Pac. RR,
88 P. 1003 (Utah 1907), had separate portions dealing with interest- one focused
on the interest rate for all claims, another dealing with the interest rates for
contracts:
[1] It shall be lawful to take eight per cent interest per annum, when the
amount of interest has not been specified or agreed upon. [2] [a] But
parties may agree in writing for the payment of any rate of interest
whatever, on money due or to become due on any contract. [b] Any
judgment rendered on such contract shall conform thereto, and shall bear
the interest agreed upon by the parties, which shall be specified in the
judgment.
Revised Statutes § 1241 (1898) (bracketed numbers and letters inserted).
The first sentence, marked "[1 ]" herein, allowed for agreements on
interest rates for claims but made the legal rate the default rate in the absence of
such an agreement. It is this sentence that Fell applied and that corresponds to
6

the current Section 15-1-1(2). See, 88 P. at 1007. The second sentence of Section
1241, marked "[2][a]" herein, dealt specifically with money due on contracts,
allowing the parties to provide their own contract rate. This sentence was not at
issue in Fell (which was a tort case) but corresponds to the current Section 15-11(1). The third sentence, marked "[2][b]," provides that the final judgment in a
contract case will bear the interest rate of the contract. This corresponds to the
current Section 15-1-4(2)(a), providing that the parties' agreement on an interest
rate supplies the prejudgment and post-judgment interest rate in contract
actions. See Utah Code Ann.§ 15-l-4(2)(a) (" ... [A] judgment rendered on a

•

lawful contract shall conform to the contract and shall bear the interest agreed
upon by the parties, which shall be specified in the judgment.").
The current statute demarcates these concepts more brightly than the 1898
statute by separating the concepts into different provisions rather than running
them together one after the other. But the provisions are all there just the same.
There is no material change to any of the relevant statutory provisions
enacted by the Legislature from 1898 to the present, as Western States suggests.
(Aplee. Br. at 2, 13-14.) The Supreme Court held the 1898 statute "allow[s]
interest in all cases at the legal rate, in the absence of an agreement." Fell, 88 P. at
1007; see also id. at 1006 (distinguishing cases in which prejudgment interest is
unavailable). This is no different from subsection (2) of the current statute,

7

•
which provides the interest rate for prejudgment interest in the absence of an
agreement.
The subsequent changes to the statute have refined the language but
retained the central meaning all the way through to the present: the statute
provides the legal rate unless the parties agree by contract to a different rate.
This is evidenced further by consistent application of the Fell rule in case law
from the time Fell was decided to the present, despite variations in the statutory
language. (See Aplt. Br. at 30-34, collecting cases.) It is not until Justice
Zimmerman engaged in his unbriefed ruminations that this consistent
application veered in a different direction.
II

The Western States defendants suggest the word contract" or the concept
of an agreed rate did not appear in any version of the statutes from the time of
the Fell decision in 1907 until 1989, a date they say marked some sort of
watershed moment when the Legislature acted to implement the idea. (Aplee.
Br. at 18.) This is simply not true. The statute at issue in Fell specifically
II

provided that parties could agree" to a different rate of interest. Revised
Statutes § 1241 (1898), Addend. Ex. 9, at 1-2. When the statute was amended in
1907, breaking one provision into several, the language providing for a
11

contract" the parties might make for a different rate of interest was moved to a

new Section 124lx. (Supplemental Addendum Ex. 10, at 3, attached hereto.) This
11

contract" wording and concept carried forward in all future versions, as a
8

separate provision akin to the 1907 version of Section 1241x and as a separate
provision akin to the third sentence of the 1898 Revised Statutes§ 1241, marked
as "[2][b]" in the discussion above, calling for any agreed contract rate to be
included as the prejudgment and post-judgment rate in the final judgment.
(Suppl. Addend. Ex. 10; Addend. Ex. 9, at 5-18.)
There is a difference through the years in legislative form and style, not in
substance, and the case law interpreting the statutes remains constant in
adhering to the Fell construction throughout these various iterations of the
statute. The present statute continues to read this way as well, as Western States
acknowledges when it points out that"§ 15-1-4 specifies that cont[r]acting
parties may set their own interest rates, and that such rates will apply to
prejudgment interest." Aplee. Br. at 22.
The 1989 statute did not add in a new concept that had never been in the
statutes before. Rather, it continued the rate-by-agreement exception to the legal
rate, but returned the form to more closely approximate that in the 1898 statute
at issue in Fell, discussing the legal rate alongside the contractual exception. In
fact, the form of the present statute is closer to what it was in Fell than in any
other version.
It is this sort of history and analysis that Justice Zimmerman glossed over
in unilaterally pronouncing his gratuitous dicta. This is the very reason why
dicta is unreliable, indulged as it is without briefing. The Wilcox Court
9

unwittingly perpetuated the problem when it glommed on to such dicta and
treated it broadly as law, albeit in a limited arena that does not govern here and
that can be fully justified on separate statutory grounds. See Wilcox v. Anchor

Wate, 2007 UT 39, ,r,r 44-48, 164 P.3d 353. The ipse dixit statements made by the
Western States defendants about purported statutory history and intent partake
of the same nature. They are untrustworthy and do not accurately reflect the
continual history of Fell and its progeny, and the statutes they interpret, for
more than 100 years. 2
Case law post-1989 reads the statute the same way as case law pre-1989.

(See Aplt. Br. at 30-34.) In fact, 1989 is not even correctly identified as the year
the statute moved back toward its present form; 1985 is. (Addend. Ex. 9, at 1516.) Thus, Western States' argument that Consolidation Coal was only the second
case to discuss a relevant version of the statute misses the mark. (Aplee. Br. at
18. )3 But even if it were, the divergent opinions in Consolidation Coal highlight

In a later decision that did not touch on prejudgment interest, the Supreme
Court emphasized the unique nature of the claims" in Wilcox, noting that its
articulation of the rule on unjust enrichment derived from the unique
considerations present in a preferential transfer case." Rawlings v. Rawlings, 2010
UT 52, ,r 47 n.62, 240 P.3d 754. The same can be said for the Supreme Court's
prejudgment interest discussion in that same case. See Wilcox, 2007 UT 39, ,r 43
("The question presented by Anchor Wate' s challenge to the interest rate is
whether the 10% default rate specified by section 15-1-1(2) is applicable to the
Liquidator's judgment obtained pursuant to the voidable preference provisions
of the Liquidation Act.").
3
The purported one other case, Nielsen v. O'Reilly, 848 P.2d 664 (Utah 1992), later
abrogated by statute, is unhelpful because the plaintiff brought forward no

2

II

II

10

•

the problem being addressed now: Justice Zimmerman made an off-the-cuff
observation, while Judge Bench, sitting by designation, assiduously studied the
case law and statutory history and followed decades of precedent-in his analysis

•

- including citing numerous cases applying the post-1985 form of the statute .

Compare Consolidation Coal Co. v. Utah Division of State Lands & Forestry, 886 P.2d
514,525 n.13 (Utah 1994) (Zimmerman individualized dicta), with id. at 528-29

•

(Bench, J., concurring and dissenting) (surveying case law), abrogated on other

grounds by State ex rel. Sch. & Institutional Trust Land Admin. v. Mathis, 2009 UT
85, 223 P.3d 1119.
A correct reading of the statute's history confirms the correct result here.

C.

Western States' Case Law Discussion Is Wholly Unpersuasive.

Like its statutory argument, Western States' case law discussion is full of
sound and fury but does not accurately characterize the jurisprudence it
invokes.

claim on which prejudgment interest could be awarded, apparently seeking
only a declaratory judgment against his insurer as to insurance policy limits.
11

1.

Wilcox has not been followed by this Court, let alone with
respect to common law tort claims.

Despite the Western States defendants' assertion, they make no showing
that this Court "has followed Wilcox," let alone with respect to tort claims.
(Aplee. Br. at 7.) The cases Western States cite for this proposition do not
support such a contention.
This Court's decision in Highlands at Jordanelle, LLC v. Wasatch County,
2015 UT App 173,355 P.3d 1047, reh'g denied (Sept. 8, 2015), does not cite or
discuss Wilcox and is unhelpful to Western States here. The trial court awarded
the plaintiff prejudgment interest of 10% pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 15-11(2) for overpayment of municipal service fees. Id.

,r,r 3-9, 27-31. The Court held

the service fees in question were contractual in nature, but did not discuss the
operation of the prejudgment interest statute except to note in passing that it
11

sets a default interest rate for most confracts at 10% per year." Id.

,r,r 30, 31. It

did not discuss the application of the statute to tort claims.
Western States also cites to Francis v. National DME, which is already fully
addressed in the Fullers' opening brief. (Aplt. Br. at 41-43.) National DME
specifically declined to decide whether Wilcox applied because the issue was
inadequately briefed.
Neither of the cases Western States cites can be accurately said to have
11

followed" Wilcox, nor are there any other cases from this Court cited for that

12

•

broad and unsupported proposition. The Court would undoubtedly be required
to follow Wilcox in any case where it applies; but that begs the very question
now before the Court, as Wilcox was not a common law tort case.
The Fullers did not themselves propose the statutory construction they
now urge; rather, the Fullers are relying on many decades of statutory
interpretation and case law handed down by Utah's appellate courts. That case
law overwhelmingly forms the basis for the Fullers' position that Section 15-11(2) "set[s] the legal interest rate at 10% per annum or, alternatively, any rate
agreed upon by the parties." Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41, 1 26, 82

•

P.3d 1064 (affirming modified jury award of prejudgment interest).
2.

Non-controlling federal court cases are unpersuasive.

Without responding particularly to the Fullers' appeal points, Western
States has essentially cut and paste from the district court briefing its argument
invoking unpublished federal cases. (Aplee. Br. at 20-21; cf R. 1808.) Western
States again refers erroneously to these singular decisions applying federal law
as "Utah case law." (Aplee. Br. at 20.) The Fullers fully addressed these cases
and Western States' argument in their opening brief. (Aplt. Br. at 46-49.)
Western States' single new citation to Caldwell v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 287
F.3d 1276, 1287 (10th Cir. 2002), highlights the distinction between jurisprudence
in the federal courts and in the Utah state courts. (Aplee. Br. at 22.) The Tenth

•

Circuit noted "[m]any circuits have held that courts are not required to use [28
13

U.S.C.] section 1961 in calculating prejudgment interest and that the calculation
rests firmly within the sound discretion of the h·ial court. We now join them." Id.
(citations omitted). That is simply not the law of this state.

3.

Peterson v. Jackson is off point.

The Fullers pointed out in their opening brief that Peterson v. Jackson, 2011
UT App 113,253 P.3d 1096, cited by Western States below (R. 1809), is unhelpful
in this analysis. (Aplt. Br. at 49-50.) The statute in Peterson specifically gave the
courts equitable discretion to determine the interest rate to be employed in the
statutory dissolution of a privately held corporation. See Utah Code Ann. § 16l0a-1434. Because no such statute exists here, Peterson is off point. Western
States intones a tepid argument based on Peterson (Aplee. Br. at 21-22), but it
falls flat as having no persuasive force whatsoever in the present context.
In sum, the statutory construction argument favors the Fullers' position. It
is the analysis the Utah appellate courts have employed since 1907. Wilcox does
not call for a different application here, in this common law tort case. The Court
should so hold as a matter of law if it reaches this point in the analysis.
II.

THE PARTIES' STIPULATION TO USE A 10% PREJUDGMENT
INTEREST RATE SHOULD BE ENFORCED.

As noted in the Fullers' opening brief, the threshold question is whether
the parties stipulated to use a 10% prejudgment interest rate. That question

14
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should be decided in the affirmative. If it is, the Court need not even reach the
statutory analysis.
A.

The Parties Stipulated to the Rate in Jury Instruction No. 29 and
Never Agreed to Have the District Court Decide a Different Rate.

There is no dispute that the parties stipulated to Jury Instruction No. 29
and the district court approved it. (R. 1631; 1969, at 68, 70, 1702.) It identified the
agreed prejudgment interest rate as 10%. (R. 1631.) Given its argument, Western
States has some responsibility to show where in the record the parties
purportedly discussed allowing the judge to determine a different rate. This
cannot be shown because it was not done.
The first time a different suggestion was made was after the verdict. (R.
1763-65.) Using terminology that had never been discussed as part of the
stipulation, Western States suggested that the parties had merely "agreed that
prejudgment interest was 'in play."' (R. 1763.) While the district court initially
accepted this premise before correcting course (R. 1795-96; 1973, at 1-12), the
fallout from this fallacious position included the stipulation on rate being lost in
the wreckage.
This Court uses a plain-language approach to the parties' stipulation,
though it may consider any relevant evidence in determining whether the
parties' expressed intent was ambiguous. See, e.g., State ex rel. H.S. v. State, 2013
UT App 239,

,r 11,314 P.3d 1005; Yeargin, Inc. v. Auditing Div'n of Utah State Tax
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Comm'n, 2001 UT 11, ,r,r 39-40, 20 P.3d 287. Western States' after-the-fact
explanation is irrelevant in determining intent, as intent may only be measured
at the time of entering into the stipulation. See Yeargin, Inc., 2001 UT 11, ,r,i 3944. This Court may interpret the intentions of the parties as a matter of law
through the language chosen to articulate the agreement. See id.; Peterson v.

Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, ,r 18, 48 P.3d 918.
The colloquy articulating the stipulation is marked by the usual hems,
haws, and unrecorded head nods common to an oral colloquy, but the language
to which the parties agreed is manifest by the record: the jury instruction would
be withdrawn and the judge would make the determination using the agreed
10% rate if the jury awarded property damages to the Fullers:
THE COURT: Well, are you - is there any argument about whether MR. BARRETT: No THE COURT: -- they're entitled to prejudgment interest?
MR. BARRETT: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. BARRETT: If there's a property damage MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Okay.
MR. BARRETT: - there's going to be prejudgment interest -

16

•

THE COURT: ... I don't see that there's a disagreement about
whether they're entitled to it or not. ...

THE COURT: ... [I]t's a simple calculation, so I really didn't care
much, because it's a 10 percent calculation and you can do it in your head.
I also don't think as I said, there's any - it's - the amount is fine ....
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Yep. Okay, so jury instruction 29 is withdrawn.
(R. 1969, at 71-73.)
Western States has asserted every variation of what the stipulation might
mean, other than the real one. Western States opposed any award of
prejudgment interest on grounds there was no stipulation reached on prejudgment

interest, but only that prejudgment interest would somehow be "in play" for the
judge to determine starting afresh. (R. 1763-65; R. 1973, at 3-5.) Later, Western
States was forced to concede that interest being "in play" is only the phrase it
"intended to use" (R. 1973, at 4) and that it "would hope the record would've
reflected a reservation to make argument." (R. 1973, at 5.) When this idea failed,
Western States argued that it intended to stipulate to prejudgment interest on

contract damages but not tort damages. (R. 1973, at 3-12.) This, too, failed. (R. 1973,
at 12.) Western States now takes the position that it stipulated only to the award
of prejudgment interest but not the rate or date. (Aplee. Br. at 31.) This Court can
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have no confidence in an asserted meaning given to the stipulation that changes
based on the perceived needs of the moment.
Western States also argues the scope of the stipulation is what is at issue
and not the fact of the stipulation, and that therefore the intent of the parties is a
factual question. (Aplee. Br. at 24-25, 31 n.18.) That is wrong on this record. The
stipulation is fairly articulated on the record such that this Court can determine
the parties' intent as a matter of law. "Often, the interpretation of the terms of a
contract ... presents a question of law that, as a general matter, may be as
readily resolved by an appellate court as by the district court." Hemingway v.

Construction by Design Corp., 2015 UT App 10, ,r 17,342 P.3d 1135 (citing
Stevensen v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339, 346 (Utah 1996) (noting that" appellate courts
are in as good a position as trial courts to interpret [legal issues such as] court
rulings")). That is the case here.

If the Court nevertheless considers the suggestion, clear error was
demonstrated in spades in the Fullers' opening brief and again here in reply to
the newly proffered standard of review. The 10% stipulation was made in the
agreed and approved jury instruction; that portion of the previously settled
stipulation was never "undone"; and the 10% standard was specifically
articulated by the court when the parties' stipulation replaced the instruction.

(R. 1631; 1969, at 69-73.) In revisiting the question after the verdict, the district
court did not review the portion of the h·anscript reciting the agreed rate as part
18
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of the stipulated instruction withdrawal, overlooking it altogether
notwithstanding the vigorous arguments of the Fullers below. (R. 1745-46, 177580; 1973 at 6-12.) The district court's failure to enforce the stated intentions of the
parties, which the district court itself had previously articulated on the record, is
clearly erroneous if this is the proper standard to apply.
Western States argues repeatedly that there was no stipulation reached on

rate or date because a different date was subsequently agreed to by the Fullers.
(Aplee. Br., passim.) This finds no support in the record. The parties stipulated to
the date just as they did the rate. (R. 1631.) Consistent with their stipulation, the
Fullers submitted for entry their judgment reflecting prejudgment interest
beginning on the stipulated date. (R. 1742-51.) The district court nevertheless
ruled that no stipulation had been reached of any kind on prejudgment interest,
required additional briefing on all prejudgment interest issues, and held a
hearing to determine the starting date for prejudgment interest. (R. 1795-96.) At
that juncture, though the Fullers had an appeal point, the district court's
decision was the law of the case. See IHC Health Servs., Inc. v. D & K Mgmt., Inc.,
2008 UT 73,

,r 26, 196 P.3d 588 (" [U]nder the law of the case doctrine, a decision

made on an issue during one stage of a case is binding in successive stages of
the same litigation.") (quotations and citation omitted).
During the course of the hearing that ensued, the Fullers agreed on the
record to a new starting date that was four months after the originally stipulated
19

date - the date of denial of their insurance claim rather than the date of the fire and they do not challenge that ruling on appeal. (R. 1973, at 12-13.) This does
not mean that no stipulation was originally reached on date. To the contrary, the
Fullers simply chose to resolve that issue on a reasonable basis - four months'
difference in time being not worth the effort, and the district court's reasoning a
satisfactory enough basis for doing so - in an attempt to find closure to longrunning litigation issues and to focus on the more important rate issue. (R. 1973,
at 2, 13.) When the district court failed to properly apply the law on the single
issue left for decision, however, the Fullers sought appellate review. This is a
prime example of proper litigation conduct consistent with appellate courts'
direction that district court proceedings should decide as many issues as they
can, so as to focus issues for appeal. See, e.g., Hemingway v. Construction by

Design Corp., 2015 UT App 10, il 17,342 P.3d 1135 (citing judicial economy as
grounds for remanding for further district court proceedings). It is simply not
true that the start date for the accrual of interest was "indisputably reserved to
the district court." (Aplee. Br. at 31.)
Western States now argues the judge's approval of the 10% rate at the
time of the stipulation is somehow ambiguous and could be referring to any
number of things besides the rate. Here is a quote of the statements Western
States now finds ambiguous:
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THE COURT: ... [I]t' s a simple calculation, so I really didn't care much,
because it's a 10 percent calculation and you can do it in your head. I also
don't think as I said, there's any - it's - the amount is fine ....
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Yep. Okay, so jury instruction 29 is withdrawn.
(R. 1969, at 73, emphasis added.) No reasonable argument can be made in this
context that the district judge was somehow merely condoning the application
of interest" to property damages, but not to rent damages," or simply approving
"the final layout of the Special Verdict form." (Aplee. Br. at 28.) Nor is there
support for the conclusion that the parties were talking solely about pending
contract claims but excluding tort claims. (Aplee. Br. at 29.)
The district court's decision letting Western States out of its stipulation
was an abuse of discretion that resulted in significant harm to the Fullers. That
decision should be reversed and judgment given to the Fullers with
prejudgment interest at a 10% rate.
B.

The Stipulated 10% Prejudgment Interest Rate Reflected the
Parties' Agreed Rate as Well as the Law.

Western States suggests there was no error in ignoring the stipulation
because 10% was not the governing legal rate and courts are not bound by
stipulations of law or stipulations that reflect erroneous statements of the law.
(Aplee. Br. at 32-33.) These arguments do not advance the ball here.
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The 10% rate stipulated to in Instruction No. 29 accurately reflects the law.

See supra Part I; Aplt. Br. at 27-50; Utah Code Ann.§ 15-1-1 (setting the "Legal
rate"). The Western States defendants would not have agreed to it in the first
place otherwise. There was no error of law.
Contrary to Western States' position, parties resolve legal issues through
stipulations all the time; but this is not the same as binding the Court on the law.
In Prinsburg State Bank v. Abundo, 2012 UT 94, 296 P.3d 709, for example, "the
parties stipulated to a list of statements that were consistent with the district
court's findings and conclusions, and additionally to a statement that resolved
the remaining claim in favor of the defendants." Id.

,r 1. Under Western States'

rubric, such a stipulation would be unenforceable because it was a stipulation
binding the court on the law. More accurately, it was a stipulation between the
parties regarding how they would approach the resolution of pending legal
claims. The same can be said for the stipulation in this case. Rather than
stipulating to "points of law requiring judicial determination," First of Denver

Mtge. Inv'rs v. C.N. Zundel & Assocs., 600 P.2d 521,527 (Utah 1979), the parties
agreed to the rate to be applied if prejudgment interest were to be awarded, thus
obviating the need for further legal proceedings on that issue. (R. 1631; 1969, at
73.)
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C.

•

There Is No Proper "Reformation" of the Stipulation Based on
"Mutual Mistake."

Wes tern States seeks to justify the district court's decision by alleging the
court "reformed" the stipulation based on what Western States calls a "mutual
mistake that the prejudgment interest rate was stipulated at 10% and that this
was the appropriate prejudgment interest rate." There was neither a mistake nor

•

one that was mutual nor would it have properly been "reformed." See Prinsburg,
2012 UT 94, iJ 16 ("Prinsburg' s mistaken belief about the effect of the
[s]tipulation[] is unfortunate, but it does not change the result.").
Western States has not set forth authority for the proposition that a
district court may properly "reform" a parties' stipulation after the fact. Nor has
it adduced clear and convincing evidence to do so. See F.D.I.C. v. Taylor, 2011 UT

•

App 416, iJ 47,267 P.3d 949 (party seeking reformation has "the burden of
proving by clear and convincing evidence that there was a mutual mistake of
fact") (citation and quotation omitted). This argument is D.O.A.
D.

The Fullers Did Not Invite the District Court's Error.

Western States suggests the Fullers somehow "invited" the district court's
abuse of discretion, though it fails to clearly articulate how this could be so.
(Aplee. Br. at 36-39.) Western States suggests it was incumbent upon the Fullers
to clarify the rate in question. Surely, a colloquy with the court in which the
judge states "it's a 10 percent calculation and you can do it in your head" should
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be sufficient clarification for any party acting reasonably to understand. Rather
than" invite error," the Fullers subsequently sought to implement this ruling in
their proposed judgment after the verdict, only to have the ruling undone in a
way that exceeded the district court's appropriate exercise of discretion.
Western States also posits that the district court's statement that "the
amount is fine" is not an appealable ruling. (Aplee. Br. at 37.) The Fullers,
however, are not trying to appeal the statement that "the amount is fine."
Rather, that statement was part of an oral ruling in which the learned district
judge concluded that a "10% calculation" would be made automatically on
prejudgment interest if property damages were awarded and, in exchange, Jury
Instruction No. 29 would be withdrawn. (R. 1969, at 71-73.) The Fullers have
appealed the district court's subsequent decision ruling that no such agreement
was reached or oral ruling made. (R. 1795-96.) The district court's latter decision
was incorporated into and made part of the final judgment and is properly
before this Court on appeal.
Western States' citation to Braun v. Nevada Chemicals, Inc., 2010 UT App
188, 236 P3d 176, is not on point. There was no appealable decision made in

Braun, as the plaintiff had voluntarily dismissed his complaint. Id. ,I 14. Here, in
contrast, the dish·ict court specifically ruled that the 10% rate agreed to by the
parties and articulated by the court as part of the stipulated oral ruling would
not be enforced.
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The Western States defendants also say error was invited because the
Fullers withdrew the jury instruction without clarifying the scope of the
agreement. (Aplee. Br. at 38.) This is not invited error, nor does it have a sound
factual premise. The Fullers had the benefit of the district court actually
articulating on the record that a 10% calculation would be used. If they are not
entitled to rely on this, then the English language carries no meaning.
E.

The Court Should Reject Western States' Untoward Accusations.

In this appeal, Western States now purports to take umbrage with the
Fullers' description of what happened in the district court. (Aplee. Br. at 39-40.)
This is a tempest in a teapot. The same appropriately descriptive idioms drew
no objection from Western States in the district court when properly used to
describe Western States' redirection of its litigation strategy after receiving an
unfavorable verdict. (R. 1775-80.) Contrary to Western States' argument, this
Court should not strike anything from the record. Nor are the Fullers asking the
Court to make a finding of fraudulent inducement.
Western States suggests here, as it did below, that it in fact meant
something different from what it said when entering the stipulation. (E.g., Aplee.
Br. at 29 nn. 15-16.) The Fullers are justified in arguing that if Western States had
meant something different, it had the obligation to say so when the district court
articulated in open court the 10% standard that would be applied and not to
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wait until after the Fullers relied on their statements before asserting a contrary
meaning.
A finding of wrongdoing by Western States is not a necessary prerequisite
to a proper decision here, and the Fullers do not suggest it is. But neither can
Western States advance a justifiable basis for making statements on the record
inducing the Fullers to forgo an approved jury instruction, then going back on
that agreement by claiming there had never been an agreement of any kind other than

to transfer all prejudgment interest decisions to the judge. That position proved
insupportable in the end, and Western States found itself required to retreat to
alternative positions, as it continues to do now on appeal. Given the actual state
of the record, not to mention the strong rhetoric sprinkled liberally throughout
its own appeal brief, Western States protests too much. The district court
recognized the Fullers had been "led into withdrawing that instruction"
through representations the Western States defendants later tried to repudiate.
(R. 1973, at 6-7.)
Nor are the Fullers impugning the integrity of the district court in the
least. To the contrary, they have taken great pains to point out that the district
court's exercise of discretion exceeding appropriate judicial bounds was 1nore
than likely unintentional. (Aplt. Br. at 25 n.5.) District judges are busy, with
much on their judicial plates. The judge did not have the benefit of a written
transcript when making his rulings, as this Court does. (R. 1973, at 7-12.) He
26
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went back and forth on his recollection of what had taken place, first agreeing,
then disagreeing, then reagreeing in part. (R. 1971, at 14-15; 1795-96; 1973, at 112). He made his decision while juggling multiple other post-trial issues in the
case, handling a trial judge's full docket, and preparing for senatorial review of
an appointment to the state appellate courts. (R. 1792-96; 1970, at 3; 1973, at 1-2.)
Despite the Fullers' urging, the district judge overlooked or omitted to recognize
that portion of the record where he had articulated the 10% standard in
connection with the parties' agreement. While the oversight is understandable,
it does not change the nature of the prejudicial error. This is the very reason
why appellate review is necessary.
F.

Western States Confuses Preservation With Estoppel.

In a final point about the stipulation, Western States argues that it
preserved its arguments on the interest rate and therefore is not estopped from
raising them. (Aplee. Br. at 41.) Western States confuses preservation with
estoppel. See Prinsburg, 2012 UT 94,

il 19 (distinguishing preservation of a

challenge to a stipulation with estoppel from challenging one). This argument
does not advance the ball. The Fullers have not suggested that Western States
failed to preserve any arguments it makes in its response brief.
In sum, Wes tern States advances no persuasive argument in its attacks on
the stipulation. That agreement should be enforced as first articulated by the
district court at the time the stipulation was made: it's a simple 10% calculation,
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and you can do it in your head. This Court should reverse and remand for that
simple calculation to be done.
CONCLUSION

This Court should reverse the district court's decision and remand with
an order that prejudgment interest should be applied using the 10% legal rate
agreed to by the parties and dictated by statute. If the Court disagrees, it should
nevertheless reverse the district court's decision and remand with an order to
consider and articulate the appropriate interest rate that should apply under all
the circumstances of this case.4

There is no basis for an award of fees and costs to the Western States
defendants. (Aplee. Br. at 43.) The district court awarded costs to the Fullers as
the prevailing party, and Western States has not appealed that decision. (R.
1951.)
4
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Utah Interest Statutes

1

1907
Compiled Laws of Utah§§ 1241x and 1241x9

2

INTEHBST.
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TITLE 38.
INTEREST.
1241. Legal rate of interest. 1'he legnl rate of interest upon the loa11 j,c
forbearance of any m01wyt goods! or things in nction shall be eight per (•eut
per nnnum. But nothing herein contained shall be so construed as to in, nL"
way affect any contract or obligation made before tho taking effect of th;\
title.
.Am'd '07, p. 43.
Jndgnwnt to include interest, § 3.'353.
'fhe tumry law or 1907 wns taken nlmost verbntim from tho stntut.es of N"w York.
Usurious bond and mortgage enforced. 1n n
stut(~ wher(~ Hwre is a sttLtutc makin~ usurv ~nnl

b1tt not, dednriug the contract \•okl. n usurious
boud and luort,_,ngc mny be, enforced for the
amount nctuulfr dmt.
H<>mheit!d v.'Vinmm, 80 LT. S. 170; not reported
in Utah r<':port~.
Interest to maturity of note. Au ~renucnt to

pay inh•TI;'iit on n not(• whid1 prO\·idt-s for ''iutc-rest
at th«' mt<• of two J>l:~r etmt rwr month from dnte,"
dol~ not <ixt,•nd tw\'nnd the time suid nok 1.Jt•com•~
due tmd pavnbh• by it~ C-1mn.1S.
Ptit·ry v;'lt\ylor, 1 U. 03.
An account stated carries interest fr<m1 tht? dnv
c,f iti, Hquidnt.ion.
..
.
·
G(xlb,1 v. Youug, 1 U. ,;5; rlffirmed 82 U. 8. 5G2.
Intero$t on Judgment is statutory. Without
tht., nuthoril.\· n !l 8t.ot.ute it, h, error for n. judgtaetit
to dirPct thrit tlw jwl~mt•ut lw:\r int«•n$t.
RtffC v. Iinott~ 3 (t, -IM; 24 P. 757.
Rule of partial payments. Th(' rule for computing iuh•n•i,t wlwn tlWN! lm\'e b<'(•Jl pnrtinl pnvmt.~nts ii! to apply tlw pnynwnt to tho d.isdm~e of
tho inten•st ilu••, nml if t tw p:l\'ment exct•1~ds the
interest, Un, ~urphli. gm~ toward dhwha~ng tlm
prinr.ipnl; if the pnym••nt Im fos.<1 tb:m tlit'~ int,,rt~t,
the 1mrplu& of th£, intun•i-.t due mul½t nut he ti~k•m t.(,
n.ugment tho prindpnl, hut intt•rest. rontinut~ ou
tlH~ rornmr prindpnl until th<' 1wriod whtin the p:wmNlti.1 t:n.kN1 h>~dlwr ,ixc(•ecl tltti int<i1·est dm\ niid
tlwn t:h~ surpluf-1 is to lK• upplh·tl tuwrtrd dhwhnrg~
1nj! tho f)rint.~1pnl.
Pt>rry v. 'foylor, 1 l'. 63.
Compound interest. ln n dN'rt-.• of forw.lo1n1ro
of tntst d"t•(l, compound inter<'st is not allownhl<',

n.nd tho dreree should nllow int,e,rest onhy r.m ifs;,
principnl nt the lJti.f)tdated mte of 18 }lt'!r (itmf;.
Shtvurl.$ Itnp~ C;.0~ v. South Ogdf.n L. It & 1. t ·., ,
20 U. :.1fl7; 58 P. 843.
Where the evidonuu in the rocord is not sttffi6i ;.t
to justify the c..omputntion of in~rt~t uprm an i·<•

cmmt <mrront, py monthly n.-sts, it is t~rror to id1 "'
s,wh comput.nttm1.
.fon(-s v. Galligher, 9U.126i 33 P. 417.

INTEREST AS DAMAGES:
lI a ,ll·ht ought to be pald nt a particular i 1i,i•·
o.tul i1t not, owing to the defu.ult of the debtor,
t.\rt~ditor iH cntitk~ to inten'fft from thnt fom>,
w:w of cumpcn$U(fon for tlw (b•luy io puyowrit.
Young v. Godbe1 82 U.S. 502.
WlH!tc a ptJrchn$(~r 1tgrcri- to f!aY lnto c:(mr-t t!w
purchn$u JJl'We of ft wUw cone(irmng which th•.-·, ,,n,
de1r huN litigntion, th,~ former will b,, linul('- for ir,,
t•Jrt•i;;t 1lurin~ t:Jw time he withholdia. tho tnont•y,
Wn~ntch Mining Co. v. Crc,iC(•nt Mining Cn., 7 ('
8; 2·1 P. 586; affirmed 151 U. 8. 317,
\Vlu-rt? it•ten~t jg rcc:owJrnblc• n.s <hunagcs ff,r •i, •
J::i.r in/>nyment~ it i~ a mnthir ln~ely in the di,"
0

,,.

tum o the court.
Culmer v. Cu.inc, 22 U. 210; 01 P. 100S,
ln tort- for unHtJUidah~I dnmu,rt-s, Jllnintiff b, H
entitled t-0 interr!'lt fN,m ttme of bringinKaetim,
. Woodlnnd v. u. P. Ry., 27 u. Ma,·20 P. 2H~; .j,k
c1tltid lSHt but not rt~po1·tt•d.
ln t.ort for u.uU9uidnt,~tl .lntnrtRe~r antr,r<•s.t (m 'h,,
r.humtget1 fi/~,~~<l from tho dath• or tho C011llW',,r>'•
nwnt of the Mtion up to tlu~ dntt, or the v,•nl'., ! i,..

not rt'<'o,·rrnhll.'.
) l;<'Stcr , •. Jligblnntl Bor G. ~I. Co., 27 U. 47!!. :-11
l .•Hl.
Niehol!\ , •. U. P. lt. R Co., 7 C. !HO; 27 P. ti~i:!

1241x. Maximum rate. Exceptions, The pnrtfos to any contract mi:,'
agree in writing f:or the pnymeut of intere8t, for the loan or forbearance of iHi.V
n10ney, goods, o.r things in actionr not to nx<~necl twelve 1mr mmL per aum;rn,
pro·vided, that on loans of tnoncy only to the amount of $100 or less1 it n,ny Ii!'
ngrl~ed in writing to tuke or receive ns interpst on said loan not to exect~d #.l
for the first mouth only o.f Nahl loan. hut thereafter uo grr.ntcr interest ~!di
he eoiitraeted for, tnkt~n or reecivetl tlum iH nllowed in this section. Thi+:1
proviso shall not he eonstrued so as to allow or permit the splitting up i>f
transactions for the Joan of monry into small amounts for t.hP- pm·1ww· A
()Vntling the provisions of this title.
'07, p . .i.a.
l'rior t.o ndoption of U J2H-1241xl 1, an ngrt•<>nwnt. for nny nltc of inter<>"-t wns lnwful in Utah.
1241xl. Id. No pei·son~ nssocintion, or eorporation shnJJ directly m· in·
dit'eetly h1lrn or i ('eeh•e in mo.Hc,y! g()fHls. or things in adiou, or in nny oti,d'
wny~ any grenter sum cw grMtm· vnlun for Um Imm or forhenr,meo of ii,,y
1nouey, goods. or things in ndion. thnn is preHcrihed in § 12-1-lx.
'07. p. FL
•

3
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IN'I'OXICA'fING LICtUOl~S.

couti·ncts 01· sacm•ities dolivorcd u,p _if in possession of the· cle·foudnnt in 11.,.
action; a_nd if the snme be m tlHt possession of the plnint:iff, provision shnll i.,.
made. in tbo ,judgment or tlccr<m in tho nution removing the .cloud nf KH•-ii
1
usurious contl'ncts 01• se,:m•it.iC$ from the tit.le to strnb prnpl11·ty.
07, p. ;:,

1241x9, Interest before e;nd afte1· judgment. Auy jndgmont 1•tmcl1•r· ,1
on n lnwflll cou1a·nct sbtlll eonform tlrnreto nnd shnll hcm1• the intnr<:•st. 1u{1·,. ,:
upon hy t.he pm·ties, which slrn.11 lw specified in the .iudgnwut.; other .im1g11w · . .
shnll h<-m1· interest nt the rote~ of Pight ptH' c~c nt p1tr nnunm, which slwll 1.. speain~d in the judgment.
R. S. '98, § 1241 _; '07, p. 45.
Jmigrncnt to. in~Jutio ini.croat Arter vt•rclicli or dcl'isioti, § 3353,
.jijiix-10." N:<>t usurious, when. rl'he di1rnount. sulc, 11nd trnusfer i11 :!w
rogµlnr cottr$;c· irl: lmshieas of negotiuhle paper· by one not the mn,ker tltPr,· ,:"
without intent to violate~ thiR titk slrnll not be const"l'uecl m1 usm·ions.
.
'07, p. 4.~,
1

1

1241xll. Bona fl.de lease itpon shares of real and personal property not

usurious. 'l'he bona fide Jimse npnn Hluu•es of rm1l
tbe owrnw thr.roof shnJJ not he ~onf!tl-1u~d

m;

and pcrsonnl proptn·t., ,.,.

n mmriomt contract.

'07, p . .r,

TITLE 39.
lN'l'OXICAr.rING LIQUOl{S.
1:242. License neoessary. No person slu1Il m,mufn:!tt\ro, Rell. bnrt.er. ,i,•:.i
oul, qr othc1·wisc: diSJ)08e of nny spil'itnouR, vinons, malt_, 01' othe1· intoxi,•ii! ''It!
li(ttl'6~, without ffrat'_ obt:ninlng from the hon rel of county crm1.n1h-u-1io11ers 1,f 'bcountK or cit.y council of the .aity, or hoard crf tl'ustees of the town in "i- 11 •i:
he 'intends to do huHittesR, a liccm:w thel'o£or, ns hercinnftlW pr·oviid.od.
t'ow~ht granted l-o l!ity council, § 20<>, l'luh, •Jl.
l'owl!r!fgnmted to tuwu t.ntstmis, § 302, sub. II.

Puw<•ri. gnmt,r.d to bonrcl of county ro1111w ······

mi;, i 011, 1mb. 11.

-1243. Id. Who ma,y grant. Petition. Bond. 'rlw bo,mls o.f r11u•11_,_.
connnissidnm'S in their· 1·especttve count.ios, and the city com1ail$. ill tlwir r•·· '·
spec,tive cities, ·a.nd tl1e .bo'nl'ds· of trt1stees-i11 l;hch· 1·eRpcntive townR, Hl't.~ lw,·, ":·
mttl~orizadto ·gi~ant licenses, llR ,~ontcm1)lat.ecl hl § 1242,. to 1my person. o \'t!r ; h•
nge' of_" tw6nt~r-one ycn11s 1 npoh m1 11ppli!!nt:ion be"ing made for such linen~•-. ln
petition si-gnod by tlrn npplicnnt ond flled witl1 the cuunty nlcrk, city rP1•t11·• !,·r.
01· town <.!1et·k, as t;ho c-nse may hu. Sniu petition mnsl: stato ·definit11lJ• tlw 1 ;H'·
t.ioulal' place nt which nny of 1;he liqnol's nnmcd in § 1242 nr<• intcmcfocl 1 • !,,.
mnnufncturecl, sold, bn1•tered, dealt cmt. or othe~·wh-11? d ispos<!cl ot nnd wh• · h,-~
the· npplieant intends to cnrry 011 n rotnil or wholesuln business. Bc>J',.,, ·1
lfoOrise is gl'anted to the npp]fol\nt he shnll execute n l>orHl to thn count,~-. ···I~
-or tow111 M the cnse nrn.y be, conditionc!d thnt ·during t.he <mutinu11nt!e 11 : I,;~
liuot1s0 ho·wm keep nn orderly n.nd well-rogulnted house; thn.t. he will 111,' ;i!'1m":ltah1bling 1\;itli .o&rcl..~, cl.ice, 01· nnr otl1er devJc~ · or ·-il'.l'.lplemm~ts. UR<'• 1 in
;g"ftnib1-h1g-, witllfo his Jfousc, m1t-house, ~,nr"d. 01· othor promiseR uiltlcr ·11 is ·1111 •
·troJ;)tliri.t he ,,,ill -pnt nll dam.n.ges, flncR, nnd fCJt-fcitm~es wl1icb may h, .11lj11tlgccf.~g~it1st him uncler a11y of" the ~rnyiaiont1 nf thia tiotlc; Said bom~ -.!wll
bo fixed by thll hon.rd c>-f connt;Y cmnm1ss10rinJ·s,. cit.y oouucil, or l)otwd ,,f ;' "' "
tees of tho town, u.s the r.ase may be, in nny Rnm nnt lcRs than $500, nor : ··•I'!'

4
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herein, the certificate may be continued for the benefit of the estate of the
child, provided the contributions are continued, or for the benefit of any
other person responsible for the support and maintenance of such child,
who shall assume the payment of the required contributions.

I

TITLE 53.
INTEREST.
3320. (1241.) Legal rate of interest. The legal rate of interest upon
the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or things in action shall he
eight per cent per annum. But nothing herein contained shall be so construed as to in any way affect any contract or obligation made before the:
taking cff ect of this title.
Am 'd '07, p. 43.

l

Judgment to Include Interest, I 7060.
Tho usury law oC 1007 was taken almost vcrbnllm from the etatutes oC New York.
Interest on email loo.ns, § 4384.
Publtc funds to draw Interest, § •soo.
In o. stato where there Is n eta.lute making
usury penal but not declaring the contract
void, o. u~urlous bond nnd mortgago mny be
enforced for the a.mount actually due,
Bernhelsel v. 1-'lrman, 89 U. S. 170; not repnrtecl In Utah reports.
An Hgrnement to pny Interest on n note
which pro\'lcles for "Interest o.t the rnte of two
per cent per month from date," tloea not extend heyorid tho time snld note be<•omcs due
uncl r,n.ynblc by lls terms.
Perry v. •r,Lylor, l U. 63.
An account stated carTles lnlerest from the
dny ur lie 1lquld11tlon.
Go<llic v. Young, 1 U. 55; 1tffirmcd 82 u. s.

r.r.z.

Without the R.Uthorlty or o. atntute It Is
error tor a judgment lo ,ure<'l that the Ju11gmflnt benr Interest,
Rt>ct•e v. Knott> 3 U. 41it: 24 P. 767.
The rule tor comrrnllng Jntcrcet when there
hn,·e been pnrtlnl pnyments 111 to npply the
1myment to the dlschurge of the lntereet due,
nn1l IC the pnyment exceeds the lnterent, the
Hm·11lue goes towa.r,l dlecharglng the i,rlncl11111: tr the puyment he lees tlurn the lntoreRL,
tho HUl'IJIUS uf the Jnterest due muat not he
l1tken to augment the prlnclpnl, but lnteroRt
roullnuc1:1 on the Cnrmer prlnclpnl ut1lll the
rw1·lrnl when tho puymcnts tnken toge-I her ox1•cctl the intereel due, und then lht' eur11lu11
111 to be upplled toworrl rllschna·glng the prlncl111ll.
Perry v. Taylor, 1 U. 63.
In n. cler.ree of Corel'louure or trust dee<1, coml
I I 1
J!nUnd lnlcl'cst I,. not n II nwn b e, ntu I te I errc-e
should nllow Interest only on tho principal at
the ettpulCltti,l rnte or 18 per cent.
Ht<-v<-ns Imp. Co. v. ~u th Ogilen L. B. & J.
C'o., 20 u. 2G7j !i8 P. 843.
,v11ere the evidence In the record IH not .RUC•
llc•lent tn Justify lho computntlon or lntl'rcst
111111n un uccount current, by monthly rests,
It le orrnr to allow such comrmtntlnn.
.lonca v. 011lllgher, 0 U, 12G: 33 P. 417.
Where 11 note provliles for Interest In Tl'J;'•
11lnr ln~tnhnonts nncl the mnlcer dernultert, hP.
le llahlo for Interest on tho sum,r In de(nult nt
the rnte nC 8 11er <'Ont.
.Jenai-n v. t,lchtenstcln, 45 U. 320: 146 P. 10:IG.
HHcovery ror monoy l11nnc1l clenll'cl u~ unt'onlll'lonnh1e, where there hns ht'P.n r<-1•nhl n Kum

•

y

;

•

.,• ~r

I·

I

3316. Continuation of benefits. In the event of the termination of
membership in the society by the person responsible for the support of any
child, on whose account a certificate may have been issued, as provided

amounting to prln<"hmJ and JS per cent per
annum Interest.
Carter v. West, 38 u. 381: 113 P. 1026.
F:ngert v, Chadwick, 40 0. 230i 120 P. 323.
In an artlon ngnlnst a r.lty, fnr extnlR under
a contract, Interest should ho nllowed nt least
Crom lhi- time thP <'lnlm was presentc<I.
Wilson v, s. L. City, 61 U. - ; 173 P. - .
INTEREST AS DAMAGES:
If a debt ought to be paht nt n. pnrllcula.1·
tlmo und Is not, owing to tho ,leCnult or the
11Phtor, the creditor Is enlltlecl tn lnterP.~t rrnm
that time, by way ot compensation for the deJny In pnymcnt.
Young v. Godbe, 112 U. R. 662.
'Where n purchuser ngree11 lo pay Into court
the purchnso price or n mine concerning which
the vendor hns lllhmtlon, the former wlll hA
Uablo tor Interest clurlng tho trmd he wlt.h•
hohls the mnnc:,·.
\Vusal<'h Mining Co. v. Crescent Mining Co.,
7 11. 8: 2-1 P. r,86: oft1rmed Hil U. S. :J17.
Where tntereNt Is recoverable su1 damng<>s ror
dclny In 1myment, It Is u. mn.tlor lurgoly In the
11lecretlon of tho court.
Culmer v. Cnlnt-. 22 U. 2lll: GI P. 1008.
In tort for unllqulclnterl dnmngPs, plnlntllT
held entltll'cl to Interest trom time ot hrlugIng action.
Woodlnntl v. U, P. R)'., 27 l.T, G-13: 26 P.
2!18; declclecl l8!H hut not rE'JlortNl.
In tort for unllqul1lated dnmnges, lntel'eel nn
the <lnmngt-e n1uies11cd rrnm tht- 1lnto or thP
f'onunen<'cmrmt of the rlcllon 111, tu lhP. dntc nf
the verdlr•t IR not rccnverahle.
l,e11ter v. lllgl1l;Ln1l Hoy o. l\1. Co., 27 u. 470;
7G P. 3~ 1.
Nichols v. U. P, R, n. Ctl., 7 U, 510; 27 P.
6!>3.
llflm11ge11 for Injury to n. shipment whfle
In transit IR the llmount of lnRR, with lnlf'-reRt,
from the llml' ot ,le)h•er)·; the fac-t thnt the
clamngcs nre unllqulrlnted nnt being by llselr
rAneon fnr nnt nllowlnir Interest.
1'..el v. U, p, R)·. Co., 32 U, 11'11: SR p. 1003.
Interest on rlninages fnr lun,I ctinclenmr.cl
flhouhl he comput.ecl from thR tlrne the <'Ont•
puny takes posee 11stnn.
s. P., 1... A. & R. J,. n. Co. v. ml. oC l•M1walion, 32 U. 101: !19 P, 263.
\Vhere lntcroRl IA n IE'gnl cone~r1uem•e or 1L
clt>mnnrl without 11111,uhtllon IL ma.y he recovered, though nol clnlmcrl In the 1,hmcllni;tR,
nn1l lntere!lt la alloworl In n tnrt, wherP perRonni property IR destrn)·ed, rrnm the d1Llo nC
the cleatntctlon
Wheatley v. 0. S. l, .. 4!1 P. JOii: H12 P. 86.

3321. (1241x.) Maximum rate, Exceptions. The parties to any contract mny agree in writing for the payment of intcrc!>t, for the loan or forbearance o( any money, goods, or things in nction, not to exceed twelve per cent
per nmmm; prm•idt'd, thnt on loi\ns of money only to the amount of $100 or
less it may he agreed in writing to take or receive as interest on said loan not
to exceed $1 for the first month only of said loan, hut thereafter no greater
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interest shall he contracted for, taken or received than is allowed in this
section. This proviso shall not be construed so as to allow or permit the
splitting up of transactions for the loan of money into small amounts for
the purpose of evading the provisions of this title.
'07, p. 43.
Prior to §§ 3320-3332, an agreement for any
rate of Interest wns lawful In Utnh.
Interest on emnll loans, § 43!12.
Wh<'TC money was left by n. principal with nn
agent to be lnnned, and the ngcnt took usury

without the knowledge of the prlncl11al, and

the prlnclpal received no pnrt of the usury, the
principal v.·a.s not chargeable with the effects
of the n,rent'e mlscomluct.
Brown v. Johnson, .f3 U. 1 i 134 P. 590.

3322. (124lxl.) Id. Penalty. No person, association, or corporation
shall, directly or indirectly, take or receive any money, goods, or things in
action, or in any other way, any greater sum or greater value for the loan
or forbearance of any money, goods, or things in action than is prescribed
in § 3321. Any person, association, or corporation, their or its agents, servants, employcs, clerks, or attorneys, violating any of the provisions of this
section is guilty of a misdemeanor.
'07, p. 43; am'd '09, p. 180.
Tf two conRlructlons are possible, the court
wlll to.ko the one ngalnst usury, a.nd a corrupt or unlawful Intent to violate the usury law
on the part or the lender le eeeentlal to render
the contract usurious.
Cobb v. Hnrtensteln, 47 u. 174: 152 P. 424.
Where a londer refused to make a loan be-

i

!.

cause the Interest would not PRY him for lookIng up the security, and the borrower agreed
to pa.y a rea1mna.ble amount for examining the
securities, the acceptance of ouch o.n amount
does not constitute usury.
Fisher v. Adamson et al., 4'1 U. 3: 161 P.
361.

3323. (124lx2.) May recover usurious loans or forbearance. Every
person who, for any such loan or forbearance, shall pay or deliver any sum
or value than is above allowed to be received, or the principal or any part
thereof of said usurious loan <'>r forbearance, and his personal representatives,
may recover in an action against the person who shall have taken or received
the same, and his personal representative, the amount of money so paid or
value delivered, both as principal and interest, if such action be brought
within one year after such payment or delivery. If such action be not
brought within said one year and prosecuted with diligence, then the said
sum may be sued for and recovered with costs at any time within three
years after the said one year hy any county superintendent of schools of the
county where such payment may have been made, for the use and benefit
of the county school fnncl, and when collected shall be forthwith paid into
said fund.
'07, p. 43.
In an action to recover back the plnlntlrr Is
not bound to establlsh the usury beyond a
renf'onnhle douht. This act Is constltutlonal.
Cobb v. Ho.rtenstcln, nu. 174: 162 r. 424,

This section le not appllcable to an action
to recover pledged property.
Conner v. Smith, 60 U. -; 169 P. 168.

3324. (124lx3.) Bonds, etc., void, when. All bonds, bills, notes, assurances, conveyances, mortgages, deeds of trust, all other contracts or
securities whatsoever, and all deposits of goods or other things whatsoever,
,.,·hereupon or whereby there shall he reserved or taken or secured, or agreed
to he rcse-rved or taken, any greater sum or greater value for the loan or
forbearance of any money, goods, or other things in action than is above prescribed, shall be void; but this title shall not affect such contracts as have
hecn made previous to the time it shall take effect.
'07, p. 44.
Cited In Culmer Paint & Glass Co. v. Gleueon
ot al., 42 u. 344: 130 P. 66.
A negotlnble note, lalnto<l with usury Is not
void nR against an Innocent purcha11er tor
value borore maturity,

Roaenhlum v. Gomoll et al., 61 U. -: 173 P.

24a.

To torfelt a note tor usury the proof must be
clenr and convincing.
Jd.

332S. (1241x4.) When complaint ia 6led for discovery of money, etc.,
borrower need not offer to pay interest, etc. ~'henever any borrower of any
money, goocls, or things in action shall file a complaint for the discovery of
the money, goods, or things in action taken or received in violation of this
title, it shall not he necessary for him to pay or offer to pay any interest
whatever on the sum or thing loaned; nor shall any court require or compel
the payment or deposit of the principal sum or thing, or any part thereof, as
a condition to the granting of relief to the borrower in any case of a usurious
loan forhiddr.n by this title.
'07, p. 44.
3326. (1241x5.) Interest, how calculated. Whenever in any statute,
act, dee<I, written or verbal contract, or in any public or private instrument

7
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whatever, any certain rate of interest is or shall he mentioned an<l no period.
of time is stated for which such rnte is to he calculntecl, interest shall he
calculated at the rate mentioned by the year, in the same h1anncr as if the
1
words per annum or by the year had been added to such a rate.
07. p. 44.
3327. (124lx6,) Defendent may call and examine plaintiff. Whenever
in any action the <le fondant shalt plead or gi\'C notice of the defense of usnry
and shall verify the truth of his plea or notice by affid.wit, he may, for the
purpose of proving the usury, calJ and examine the plaintiff as a witness in the
same manner as other witnesses may be called nn<l examined.
'07, p. 44.
3328. (1241x7.) Offender to answer to any complaint filed against him.
Every person offending against the provisions of this title may be compelled
to answer on oath any complaint that shall be filed against him in any court
for relief.
'07, p. 44.
3329. (124lx8,) Court ahaU declare any bond, etc., void, when. Whenever it shall satisfactorily appear by the-·admission of the party, or hy proof,
that any bond, biU, note, assurance, pledge, conveyance, mortgage, deed o[
trust, contract, se,:uritv, or other evidence of debt has been taken or received in violation of the provision of this title, the conrt shall declare the
same· to be void, and enjoin any prosecution thereon, and order the same to
be surrendered and canceled, and any property, real or personal. embraced
within the term of said contracts or securities delivered up if in posse!-sicm
of the defendant tn the action; and if the same he in the possession of the
plaintiff, provision shall be made in the judgment or decree in the action
rC'moving the cloud of such usurious contracts or securities from the title
· ·to such property.
'07, p. 45.
A f<>rtelture tor usun· wlll not be declnrecl
except on clear nnd convlnt-lng evidence tha.t
the lender pa.rlklpnted In or benefited by the
t1•nns1icuon.

Brown v. Johnson, 43 U. 1; 134 P. 590.

Forrellur<>a hereunder enrorcc,1 only when
pronf Is c•lear 1md convlndng.
Culmer Pnlnt & Olltse Co. v. Olcn1wn et nl.,
42 u. 344: 130 P. li6.
RoKcnblum v. Gomoll, lil U. - ; li3 I'. :?13.

3330. (1241x9.) Interest before and after judgment. Any judgment
r~ncler<'cl on a lawful contract shalt con form thereto and shall hear the interest agreed upon by the parties, which shall ·be specified in the judgment;
other judgments shall benr interest at the rate of eight per cent per annum,
which shall he spcdtit"d in the judgment.
R. S. '98, § 1241; '07, p. 45.
Jutlgment -to Include lr.t.erest a!ter verdict or decision.

§ 7050.

(1241x10.) Not usurious, when. The discount, sale, and transfer in the regular cottr!'~ of business of negotiable paper by one not the maker
~hereof without intent to violate this title shall not he construed as usurimts.
'07, p. 45.
3331.

A hol<ler without knowledge or previous
uaurlous transactions may rec:over on thr. note.
Roeenblurn vs. Gomoll, 61 1!. - ; 173 P. 243.

3332, (1241xll.) Bona fide lease upon shares of real and personal·
property not usurious. The bona fide lease upon shares of real nnd personal
propc.-rty by the owner thereof shall not he construed as a usurious con trnct.
'07, p. 45.
One plerlglng proporty to eerure the pnl·ment
or u uaurlous lonn, and making payments nggrC>gatlng more thnn tho money horruwed, hnR
n right, under \his section, to recover tho

pl<>dgell propcrt)', U 8UC'.h f\Ctlon IR !'UhJ<H·t to
nny period or llmltallon It ls thnt tlxr•cl hr thP
gcneru.l BtlllUlf'II,
Connor. v. Smith, 51 U. -; Jfi!l r. ms.
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TITLE 44
INTEREST
,u-o. . l.

LcJ.{al Unte.
The legal rate of interest for the loan or for*
heatancc of any money, goods or things in action
shall be eight per cent. per annum. But nothing
herein contained shall be so c<rndtrued as to in
any way affect uny contract or obligation made
he fore tlw l <1th day of Muy, 1907.
(C. L. 17, -~ :{:{20.)
-H-·-0--2. Maximum Rates.
The partit•s to a11y contract may agree in writ•
ing for tlu.~ payment of int.ere.Ht for the loan or
forbearance of any money, goods or things in ac•
tion, not to exc.·eedr ux.cept as otherwiim provided
by law, twclve per cent per annum; pt<H 1idecl,
that on loan!'l of money only, to the amount of
$100 or Jes~. it may he agret~d in writing to take
or rci,;·eh'e as intcircst on such Joan not to exceed
$1 fur the first month only of such loan, but
thereafh~. no greater interest shaJJ he contracted
fot\ taken or received than is allo\vcd in this section. Thi::: proviso shalJ not bf! construed to allow
or permit the splitting up of transact.inns for the
Joan of money into small amounts for the purpost: nf evading the pro,·isfons of thi::1 titl(.'.
1.C. L. 17, ~ :rn21.)
•

lb.\t' <•f i11t.-r(•:1t nllo·o\·1·•1: On Small Loanl\, ,.~.,,: To In<lustritll
L'-.,~•tl <:~,rJ)orationA, 'i --~i-a; 'I\l Pa~~nhr<;.k(<r>.<. 70. . 0. . :!.

l:!.•.f l":r annum :rn•I 1•.~ l>•'I' nwnih, the 1mnn,.
•lvhti:;on, 1g.1 f'. fitlO, -13 U. l, !!!I A. L H. 110:J.

;1 t-0-:J.

Brl;wn \> •

Cakuluc ed hv the Year.

When(.)rnr in any ~iatute or deecL or ,vritten
or vt•rbal contract. or in any public or privnte
instrument whatenu any certain rate of interest
is mentioned and no period of time i~ stated, interest shall be culculated at the rnte mentioneo
by the year.
(C. L. .17, ~ :l:126.)
••

-l<J ... Q... 4.

Jnten.•~t on Judgments.

fled in the judgment; other judgments shall hear
intm·est at tlu~ rate of t~ight per cent per annum.
i'C. L. 11,
3:rno.)

*

Thi,; iwrtlt>n ha•1 nn it1'1>lknli,m i•x1·<•11t t11 JH'l'Hctnal jucl1rm,,nt,1.

H---0,~5.

H--0-6. Id. Contract,s Void.
AJI bonds, bills, notes, assurances, conveyances, stocks. })ledges, mortgages and deeds of
trust, and all other contracts and securities whatgoe\'er, and aJJ deposits of good.s or other things
whatsoever, whereon or whereby there shall be
reserved or taken or secured, or ngi-ec~d to be resen·ed or taken or secured, any greater sum or
greater ralue for a loan or forbearance of any
money, goods or things in action than is above
prescribed shall be void.
( C. L. 17, § 8324.)
•14-0---7.

Id.

Ueconi..ry o( Payments-Limitn•

tion of Action.
Every person, or in the event of his death his
personal representatives, who shall pay or deliver any greater sum or value than is allowed by
this title to be received for or on any loan or forbearance, or who shall pay the principal or any
part thereof of a usurfous loan or forbearance.
may reco\·er from the person who shall have
taken or received the same the amount of money
so paid or value delivered, both of principal and
interest, provided action is brought within one
year after such payment or delivery. If such action is not brought within said one year and
prosecuted with diligence, then the superintendent of public instruction may sue for and recover such sums, with costs, at uny time within
three years after said one year, for the use and
benefit of the state district school fund, and the
sum so collected shnll be forthwith paid into said
fund.
( C. L. 17, § 3a2a.)
Althvu$rh thi~ iw<•tion u-ives th(> ri;:ht o(

Any judgment rendered on a lawful contract
shall conform thereto and shalJ bear the interest
agteed upon by the parties, which ,hall he sped~

Sidrwy St(•V\•11;1 111111. l'o, v. So. 01-rd~n L.
,,i- l'. !<H. io U. '.!67.

heuranee of any money, goods or thing:; in action

than is prescribed in section 44~0-2. Any person
violating nny of the provisions of thifi section
is guilty of a misdemeanor.
(C. L. 17. § :1a22.)

II. & Jnw. Cn,,

Usury-Tuking Excessive lnterc~t n
Misdemennnr.

No per~wn shall, dirccOy or inditeetly, t.a.ke or
:receive in ~i:.~rviceA, money nr other propt~rty, any
grf.>ater ~um nr g1·enter nduc for the loan or for-

!'ff0\'1?1'Y

t'(•Wfr or his pen;onnl ::-1tpre"'cmtntlrt;a, in view

vh,lnit JlllftMr m11y maintain th~ .ndion.
Hi:? P. ·12·1, -li U. 174.

o(

to the ll(,!'¥

I 02-1 t.9 n l!<Ur-

ColiL v. Hnrh!n~u•in,

Id. Hepayment of Comdderation Not
n Condition Precedent.
Whniever any borrnwer of money, goods or
things iu action shall file a complaint for thci
recover:· of tlw money. gnod8 or things in action
taken or recdvcd in violation of this title, it .shull
not lm necessary for him to pay
offer to pay
any intcre:-:tt what<.>ver on the sum nr thing
loaned: nor shall any court requirn or eompel
Urn pa,rment nr deposit of the pl'ineipal sum or
thing. or any part thereot, as a condition to the

,M-·0--8.

c,r

grantintr of t·t~Jief to the honow<~- in any cn.se
of n t1Httri<n1N Imm.
(C. L. 17, H325.)
•

*
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Title 4.f-Jnterest
t\xin,r dHTt-rcnt. rote, allowing interost
at rnl.c o! 0 ,1jx cent.a on the hundred" by

th~ year).

Jowo Code

1oao, § 9404

(l'ftve centa on

the huntJrecJ'' by the ye1u unless po.rtieJJ
usm.-e in writing tor payment of interest
not exceeding "seven centa on the hun•
,lr-c-dH 1,y the yenr).
l\lont, Hcv. Codes, § 7726 (in absence
of expreas contrnct in writinsr fixing

different r11tc, el x per cent r,er annum
''except. [es lo] a judgment•),
CrnRR• re-f~rent't-B.
Rcp;ullltion by special laws prohibited,
Con~t. Art. VI,§ 26; payment of intercfit
llS extcncHntr stntutc ol )imitations, I 042-46.
Pormer rate.
Thus it will he seen that former rate
wnR ten P'-'t' cent y,er annum. Openshaw
v. t! lnh & N. Ry, Co., G U, 208, Zl P, 000,

1.

2.

PawnbrokerH and money lenders.

So far

nR

7-6-3 conflicta with this

Rection uncl title it must prev11il, for the

former leKislutinn is a special and subsequent ttct, and rcpenh1 uan IPWS In con1tlct" therewith. People's Finance &
·rh1•ift Co, v. VnrnCl', 76
366, 286
P. :I04.

u.

lnHlalments.
Whc1-e n note provided for p11yn1ent ot
inlct'cKt. in regulu1· instalments and
mok,r dcfeullcd, such mnker was
linhlc fur int(.'rCftt on sums in default

3.

nt Tille of eight per cent, as fixed
by this scrtion. J~nsen v. LichlcnRLein,
46 U. a20, 145 P, 10:IG,
.f.

DehtA overdue.

Tn Utuh, intercat in ollowecl on deb~
nver,lu~, even in ahaence of statute or
contract providing therefor. Wasatch
)fin. Co. v. Crescent Min. Co., 7 U. 8,
Hi, 24 P. 6HO, ufT'd 151 U. 8, 317, 38 L.
rM. 177, 1-t S. Ct. 348.
Sthool dlatrlct&.
School district, where it hna received
b~nt-fit or goods, ~hould pay Jcgal rate
of intcre&t from date It received benefit
uf its contract. Baker Lumber Co. v,
.\. A. Clttrk Co., 6:J U, 3!J6, 178 P. 764,

!i.

F.iteht of re,conry by borrower,
WhP.rc one loaning money hod received
full umount of money loanecl Rnd interest
ut rule of 16 per cent per nnnum, debt
wns fully paicl, nnd tencl<'r could not recnv«!r nnylhin,r in ndclition. Corter v.
W<'st, !l8 U. :J81, 113 P. 1026.

6.

[348]

7.

Determination o( earnlm: power of
money.
This rate cormot be uRc<l ns n baeia
ot ua·L·iving .u.t the rcoaonublc l'Urnin.a

power o( money, in csthn11tin,t ch,me~s
plaintiff is 4!ntitled to in action tor ~r•
1mnDJ injuries. KlinR'<! v. Southt'rn Pnc.
R. Co.L. 89 U. 284, 280, 67 P.2cl :lli7, 106
A, L, u, 204.

lk-tiaionB from ol hn JqriKcUctions,
- Federal,
County bonds payable in New York,
held to dn,w interest o.ltcr mnturity
under tho Jaws of Iowa 11nd not uncicr
thotte of NQw York. Cromwell v. Snc
County, 06 U. S. 61, 24 L. E<l. 081.
-Iowa.
Where A contract is mode in one slut~
to he perfol'med in unother, the inl~l·cst
will be computed nccording to the law
or the place of p~rformnnce, but the
purUes may stipulate thut inlQrc~t shall
be c:ulculnte?d atecording lo the luw,1 of
lhe place where the contruct i~ mudc.
Butters

v. OldR, 11 lown

1.

Interest nt f!cven per cc>nt ncrordin1t
to the luw of anolhcr Rlnlc is pro~rly
nl1owed on money due un<l«."r u <:ontract
made in thnt Rtnle to uvoicl u will con•
test.

Denson

v. Suwycr, 210 luwo 841,

240 N. W. 424.
A stipulation !or n higher rult! or
int.crest otter n111turit:,, iR properly enforced.

Penn Mut. Life In11. Cn. v. 01·r,

217 Iowa 1022, 262 N. W. 7-SS.

.\. I... It no tea.
Agreement to rcc<!i\'c Ronmthin,r other
than money fo1· loun, 05 A. L. R.
1231.

ExpenseH or chnr~s (inclu<lin11: tuxes)

incident to loun or mone?y, G:J A,
L. R. R23.
LKW of the lorunt os i?oVcrninJt tho
ri1?ht to and rate of int.c.-r<'st ne <lam•
ages tor delay in pnymct1l of moncv
or discharge of othe?r ohlighllons.
78 A. L. R. 1047.
nutc of interest after m11turity on con•
tmct naming rote but not cmployinr
t~rm 11 unti) r,uid.'' OT eimllur phrnec,
76 A. L. R. 390.
Rote or intc~at nttcr nrnturil)• on con•
trn('tl\ fbin~ ruto uunlil puyn\cnt,"
6 A. (.,, R. 1 l OG.
Stntut<'s in reh,tion lo int~rt'P.t ns ob.
noxious to t'onatitutionol i,rovision
a~ninat impoirinit ohlig11tion o( con-

lroct.8, R7 A. L. R. 402.

Vnlitlity und elTcct or nnticlpntm·~• p1·0•

vision in canlrnct in r<tlr&tion to rnLe
of intereat in <'vent of rlefnult, 12

A. L. R. :rn7.

Maximum Rates.
The parties to any contract may agree jn writing for the payment of
interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods or things in
action, not to exceed, except as otherwise provided by law, ten per cent
-14--0-2.
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per otmum; vro·-,:idecl, that on loans of money only, to the nmount of
$100 or less, it may be agreed in writing to tnke or rect'ive ns intcre:-;t
on ~uch loan not to exceed $1 for the firHt month only of such loan, but
thereafter no greater. intere~t shall be contracted for, taken Ol' received
than i~ ullowcd in thiM Rection. This proviso shall not be conMtruecl to
nllow or permit the ~plitting up of trun~ections for the loan of mon<!y
into t4mnll amounts for Lhe pUl'po.sc of evading the provi:don~ of thi~
title.
No contract for the purchmse of any goods, wnre~ or merchancli~e or
)mm or forbearnnc(! of money, shnll contnin any proviMion providing
for H handling or ~crvice charge on any said contract, or any commercinl
chnrge on Maid contract, or any charge whatKoever, which when taken
together with the intere:.;t chnrged on Nai<l contract for lhc ~ale of good~.
wares or merchandise, or for the loan or forbearance of mone)', exceed~
ten pe1· cent per annum of the unpaid principal ~um of Kaid loan or
conh'nct, except; (a) a contract mny ~pecificallr provide for n Ncrvlce
charge, which charge Hhnll not exceed four per ct?nt per annum of the
unpaid bnluncc of the imid principal ~mm, :rnch 14ervicu churl(e to b<!
npplied but once on uny trun~action and HhHll not be aga\in applied in
cnsc of rerunding 01· rcllC\\'ttl of contrRct between the 1mrtieH concerned
with the oJ·jginul tranHaction nor shall ,:such Hervice chnrgc be subject
to nny ndditional 8crvice charge, intercHt charge or pennlt~·; (u) u
reu~onable uttorncf:1 foe in cu~m of collection by an uttorney; ancl (c)
~uch exceptiortl-4 UH are otherwiHe provided by law.
Jntel'e~l accruing on lonn~, contracL.. , forbearance of mone)', good~.
or thing~ in nction, under section:i 44-0-1 and 44-0-2, Revis~tl Statutt!li of Utuh, 1!)3:J, when pttid in advnncc or othcrwhw ~hull not exceed
the rate of lcn pur cent per nnnum.
(C. L. 17, § 3321.)
tfl,c(ory.

J.

.-\~ 111nt1ntlc•d lty L. !15, <"h, 42, ~ff.
,Junl' 15, 11uh1-1tilulin~ ''trn, 11 in third Jin<',
fnr tw<·lvl•/' nml uchJing J11Kt lwo pern•
a:ru1>hR.
Th~ 1wt•11c•nt MCt'lion hcnr~ litll<' simi•
lu rit y tu i L~ precl<1c1.•~Rn1·s, except th11t it
hu" nlwuy~ hl'l'n rrnvidi:>d that thl're nun·
ht• n convt•ntiuniil rnl<'. R. S. 1808,
~ l:!.tl: Comp. LtlWll 1907, § 1241x.
0

C'nmpa.rahfo IJto·risinns.
J,tuho C<>clci, 1!>40 Supp., §20-1906
f nnl to <'xc,'Cd ci,:rht per cent per annum
hy UJ:"l'<'<'nwnt. in writlnR'; on loan o! ,UOO
or ll'ti~, whorl' inlt'rcst ehnrgcd for dura1inn o( lonn ht lr~s thnn $1, scrvic~ cha)1fe
mnr I><' 111ndr ('(tunl to difference between
~um of $1 ancJ int<'r<!'l'l chorgc<l; judg.
tnl'nl on ~uch conlrn<'t, inter-e11t at six
per <'Ont ,,rr nnnurn).
Mont. nev. Codrs, § 772.(i ( not t.o C?X•
rc<',I trn f}('I' cent J>l'r nnnum hy writt~n
n,crrecn,<'n t).

r

(" rnKK • r(' f' rt' nfeA.

Rnto nUowcd on !:'mall Jonna, 7-8--5,

7-R-RB~ to industrial loan corporationa,
i-6-:l: to pawnhroker11, 70-0-2; to c0w
npernti"" hunkll, 7-7-16.

Loan for )("tHt than one y~ar •
L:nclcr former fl.Cction one per ci?nt a

month woR prl\eisely 12 per cent per
unnum, und thiA was e"'J)('ciolly M where
lhl' loan w11a fo'r lrs~ than a whole yepr,
Umwn v. Juhn~on, 4:J U. 1, 7, 134 P. 600,
4Ci I,. R. A. (!-:. S.) 1167, Ann, C,u.
HllH C :121.

2.

DdenRe ar usury,

In ault lo forccloi:ac corpornlc mort•
Jrlllfe, 11tockhol<ler e>( nmrla:ngor cnnnot
intcrponc defense of usury prccli<'ntcci on
Jdft,i nf Rtork to morlgn~cc hy oth(!r
~tockholders which, iC added to intere,t
provided in mortgage, would mHkc it
u11uriou11, aince dden11c of u14ury is per•
11onal to morl,l'OKor. RoapigJioJti v. Gl~n•
alien Min. Co. (Grncc et al. 1 inter•
vt-ncrs) o9 U. 41, 262 P. 276.
1

S.. Reconr7 on 11eurloa1 ttontrad.
Jn action againat finance company

to

r~cover principal and lntereat on alleged
u11urioua loan, demurrer to complaint

11hould have been austained ln absence of
allegation that contrcict waa made in
Utah or wa11 subject to ill Jawa, Farrer
v. AtJaa Acceptance Corp., 97 U, 261, 92
P.2d 720.
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44-0-3. Cnleulated by the Year.
Whenever in any statute or deed, or written or verbnl contrnct, or in
any public or privutc in~trument whnte\'cr, any certain rate of interc[d
is mentioned and no period of time is ~tntcd, intcreKt ~hull be calcuJated at the rate mentioned by the ycnr.
(C. L. 17, § 3326.)
A. L. It. notft.

Con11trurtion of conlroctunl provisions
u11 to interest us regards time from
which int.nest iR to be ton1puted, 69 A.

I... It 068; time nt which interest is p11yuhle under will or controct providjnar
!or payment of Interest, 10 A. L. R. 997.

.t-t-0-f.

Interest on Judgments.
Any judgment rendered on a lawful contruct ~hall conform thereto
and Rhall bear the intere~t 1\greed upon by the p1u·tics, which ::thnll l,e
specified in the judgment: other judgmentR ~hnll bear interest at the
rnte of eight per cent per annum.
(C. L. 17, § 33:l0.)
HINlory.

The f\rat purt of this Rction is almoat
iclenlicol with R, S. 1898. § 12,U; and
this section ie exaetlv identical with
{'omp. Luw11 1907, 1241x9.

('ompaubJe provisions.
Jnwa <.:odt'.\ 1039, § 9405 ( 5 cents on 100
by th~ ycur, unless dift'cL·cnt t·atc is fixed
hv contract on which judgment or decree
i~ rendered, in which cusc intu-,Ht oct·orclin~ to t'ontract but not exc~ding 7
cents on 100 by the yeur).

C'rotl8•n•fert-nteR..
Intcr<1st to he included in judgment
('nlr~·. 104-44-10.
Gt'nere.1 •ppli~abllitJ' or R~tlon.
Jt i~ only to perftonal Judgments that
this 11ection applieA. Sidney Stevens
Jmplcment Co. v. South Ogden Land,
Hulldln,r & In,provcment Co., 20 U. 267,
5A P. 84:J.
J.

2.

Allul'·an<"~ of interl'et bltfore Juda'·

numt.

The true l(•st to be nppli(\d os to
whtfth~r inbrl'st should be oUowetl he-

fore Judgmen~ ln a-lven aso or not
i,1 not whether clnn111JteS nre unliquidiited

1>r othcrwlac, but whether injury and
t"oneequent dam11ges ore complete an<l
must he ssrertainetl 11s of particular
tln1c ond in act'ordRnce with fixed rulca
of evidf'nce, Frll v. Union Pnc. Ry. Co.,
:12

t1. tot. 88 P. 100:J, 28 L. R. A. (N.

S.) I, t:J Ann. Cns. 11!37.

3.

lntt-reRl on dam&Kes.

Aw,,rd of intereRt on dumagca ~ufferecl
hy 1·enRon of brench of building contruct
from time they were suff'orcd at leRRl
ruw held propl'.'r as ng-ainBt contention
thnt J\incc dllmn5reR were unJiquidatcd, no
inlercRt could be ulJowed until nfter juchcment. l:Jlnghunt Coal & Lumlu~r Co. v.
n(lorcl or Educntion or Jorclun School
J>i~t. ot Sult t,nko County, 61 U. 14!>.
211 P. ORI.
RHtlllt'H nr d~t"d('nlfl.
Where widower oncl executrix both
dnimed ccrtnin moneys on deposit in
h:rnk und Rlipulatccl that such money
11houlil remain in hank nt four per coM
int~rci1l until outcotne of litig-11tion to
clctcrminc rirlhts lo 11uch tnoney, ex•
c-cutri:< WRR not entitled to ndditioni,1
four pt"r c<"!nl on juJ$l'tnent from time it
wu~ rc.-n,1t)r1•d to time rPmittitur wa~ fih•«I
nflt'r npp11ul by widowttr. Evnncnvich v.
~-

Schill~r.

5.

tm

U. 1, 26 P.2d 8:10.

Amendment

or JudA"mfnf.

Jurhrm~nt re-vised to induclc int<.•rcxt
nt fftututory r11te wher~ supreme court
h,111! inadvr.rtcnlly omittt"d it from itf!
opinion. Ke-lier Y. Chourno11, 96 U. 31,
70 P.2d

~o.

l>KiMlonR from other JuriKdiclions.

- lo~·o.

In an uclinn in equity, inwreat mlly be
diRcretionnrily allowed thou.Rh not
clainmt in pleadings.
John11on v,
Roherts, 220 Iowa 118.(, 206 N. W. 35A.

M-0-5. Usury-Taking ExceSt1ive Interest a Misdemeanor.
No per~ou shall, directly or indirectly, tltke or receive in .~erviccR,
money or other property, any greater Mum or- greater VRluc ror the lonn
or forbearance of any money, goodN o"r things In action thnn i:1 J>rcHCribed in section 44-0-2. An~· per!-ton violating any of the provhdon=-'
of this Nection i~ guilty of a mi~demeanor.
(C. L. 17, § 3322.)
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CONTRACTS AND OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL
Rate ·of interest after maturity -on obligation which fixes rate of interest expressly until maturity, 16 A. L. R. 2d 902.
Statutes in relation to interost as obnoxious to constitutional provision:· against·
impairing obligation of contracts;' 87 A:..,
L. R. 462.
. Validity· and effect of anticipatory provision in contract in relation· to rate ·of
interest in· event of default, 12 A. L. R.
367·.
.

Law of 'the forum as governing tho right
to and rate of interest as damages for do:
lay in _payment of money or discJ,iargo of
other obligations, 78 ·A. L. R. 1047.
Rate of interest aftor maturity on contract n·a ming rato but -not employing torm
"until paid," or similar phrase, 75 A. L. R.
399.
Rate of interest· aftor ·maturity on contracts fixing r ate "until payment," · 6 A. L .
R. 1196.

15-1-2. Maximum rates.-'fhe parties to any contract may agree in
writing fo_r the payment of interest for the loan or forbearance of any ·
money, goods or things in action, not to exceed, except as otherwise prov-ide'd by law, ten per ·c ent per annum; provided, that on loans of money
only, to the. amount·_ of $100 or less, it may b_e agreed in writing to take
or receive as interest on such loan not to exceed-$1 for the first month only
of such loan, · but thereafter no greater interest shall be contracted for,
taken or received than .is allowed in this section. · This proviso shall not be
construed to allow· or permit th·e splitting up of transactions for the loan:·
of money into small amounts for the purpose of · evading the provisions
o·f thi·s chapter.
No contract for the · purchase of any goods, wares or merchandise or
loan or forbearan_ce of money, sh all contain any; provision providi]?.g for.
a · handling or service charge on any said contract, or any commercial
charge on said contract, , or any charge whatsoever, which when taken
together with the interest charged on said co_ntract for the sale of goods,
wares : or merchandi$e, or for the loan or forbearance of money, excee:ds.
ten :per cent per· annum of the unpaid principal sum of said loan or
contract, exceJ?t; (a)
c_o ntract may specifically provide for a service
charge, which charge shall not exceed four per cent per annum of the
·unpaid· balance of the said principal sum, such service charge to be applied
but once on. any_transaction and shall,:not be again applied in case of
refunding or renewal · of contract between the parties concerned with the
original transactio_n nor shall such service ch ar ge be subject to any additional . service charge, interest charge or penalty; (b) a reasonable attorney's fee in case of eollection by an attorney; and ( c) such exceptions
as are otherwise provided by law.
Interest accruing
loans, contracts, forbearance· of money, goo'ds, or
things in action, under- sections 15-1-1 and 15~1-2; when pa:id in advance
or otherwise shall not exceed the rate of ten p er cent per annum.

•
•

•

a

I'

I '

,I
I

on·

Hist ory: L. 1907, cb. 46, § 2; c. L . 1907,
§ 1241:x:; C. _J;,. 19171 § 3321; R. S. 1933,
44-0-2; L. 1935, cb. 42, § 1; 0 . 1943, 44-0-2.
Oompilei:'s Not;~s.
'l'he 1935 . 'li:mondment reduced tho rate
specified iri the first sentence· from 12 per
cont to 10 per cont, and added tho last
twQ. paragraphs. .
.
The,, roferen·co af tho on:d of the first
paragraph to" "this chapter" appeared in
tho act as "this title." The refcronco in
tho last paragraph to "sections 15-1·1 and

15-1•2" appearod in th~ act as "a~e~iona
44-0-1 and 44-0-2, Revised Statutos of
Utah, 1933."
Tho presont section boars little simi:
larity to· its predecessors, except th~t it
has .alwayl! boon provided t ho.t thero ·may.
be a· conventional rate. R. S. 1898, § 1241.
(now repealed); Comp. Laws 1907, § 124lx.

•

Effective Dato.
Section,.2 of Laws 1935, ch. 42 provided
t hat said act should take effect June 15,
1935.

810
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CONTRACTS AND OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL

Law Reviews.
Usury in California, by William Tristam Coffin, 16 Cal. Law Review 281, 387.
Usury, by Raymond B. McConlogue, 1
So. Cal. Law Review 263.

Oollatoml Roferenccs.
Interest€=>29.
47 C.J.S. Interest § 32.
Rate of interest, 30 Am. Jur. 25, Interest § 31 ct seq.

•

Retrospective application and effect of
statutory provision for interest or changed
mtc of interest, 4 A. L. R. 2d 932.

16-1-3. Calculated by the yea.r.- Whenever in any statute or deed, or
v,:ritten or verbal contract, 01' in any public or private instrunient whatever,
any certain rate of interest is mentioned and no period of time is stated, •
interest shall be calculated at the rate mentioned by the year.

•

History: L . 1907; ch. 46, § 7; 0. L. 1907,

§ 124lx6; 0. L. 1917, § 3326; R. S. 1933 &
O. 1943, 44-0-3.
Collateral Refer ences.
Interest€=>40.
47 C.J.S. Interest § 42.

•

16-1-4. Interest on judgments.- A.ny judgment rendered on a lawful
contract shall conform thereto and shall bear the interest agreed upon by
the parties, which shall be specified in the judgment; other judgments shall
bear interest at the rate of eight per cent per annum.
History: L . 1907, ch, 46, § 11; 0 . L. 1907,

§ 124J.x9; O. L. 1917, § 3330; R. S. 1933 &

o.

•

Comparable Provision.
Iowa Code ,1950, § 535.3 (5 cents on 100
by the year, unless different rate is fixed'
'by contract on which judgment or decree
is rendered, in which case interest is according to contract but not exceeding 7
cents on 100 by the year).

I'

Cross-Reference.
Interest to be included in judgment
entry, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule
54(e).
Const ruction and operation generally.
It is only to personal judgments that
this section applies. Sidney Stevens Implement Co. v. South Ogden Land, Bldg.
& Improvement Co., 20 U. 267, 58 I>. 848.
This section provides that judgment,
which is not upon obligation where rate
of interest is fixed, shall bear interest at
rate of 8 per cont per annum. McFarlane
v. Winters, 114 U. 502, 201 P. 2d 494.
Utah Code doc& not prevent inclusion
of interest due as part of principal of
judgment to be rendered. McFarlan e v.

1.

•
•
•

1943, 44-0-4.

Compiler's Note. .
Tho first part of this section is almost
identical ,vith R. S. 1898, § 1241; and this
section is exactly identical with Comp.
Laws 1907, § 124lx9.

•
•

Construction of contractual prov1s1ons
as to inter est as regards time trom which
interest is to be computed, 69 A. L. R.
958.
Time at which interest is payable under
will or contract providing for payment of
interest, 10 A. L. R. 097.

Winters, 114 U. 5021 201 P. 2d 404, construing t his section.
2. Allowa.11ce of interest before judgment.
The true test to be applied as to whether
or not inter.e st shonld be allowed, before
judgment in given case, is not whether
damages nre unliquidated or other wise,
but whether injury and consequent damages are complete and must be ascertained
as of particular time and in accordance
with fixed rules of evidence. Fell v . Union
Pac. Ry. Co., 32 U. 101,· 88 P. 1003, 28
L. R. A. (N. S.) 1, 13 Ann. Cas. 1137.
3. Interest on damages.
Award of ~nterest at legal rate on damages suffered by reason of broach of build·
ing contract from time they were suffered,
held pr,oper ns against contention that
siuco damages were unliquidated, no
interest could b~ allowed until after judgmon\. l?ingham Coal & Lumber Co. v.
Board 'of Education of Jordun School
Dist., 61 U. 149, 211 P. 981.

4. Estates of decedents.
Where widower and executrix both
claimed certain moneys on deposit in
bank and stipulated that such money
should·. remain in bank at four per cent
interest until outcome of litigation to
determine rights to such money, executrix
was not entitled to additional four per
cont on judgment from t ime it was rend·

312
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TITLE 15
CONTRACTS AND OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL
Chapter
15-1. Interest.
15-2. Legai ~apacity of children.
15-3. Interparty agreements .
15-4. · Joint obligations.

•

CHAPTER 1
INTEREST

•

Section
15-1-1. Legal rate.
15-1-4. Interest on judgments.

• 15-1-1. Legal ute. The legal rate of interest'f6r the loan or forbearance
money, goods or things in action shall be SHf f}el' eeftt 10% per annum. But n
herein contained shall _be so construed _as to in any way affect any penalty or i
est charge which by law applies 'to delinquent o.r .,other taxes or to any con
or obligations made before the 14th day of May,~ 1981.

•

....

~

History: L. 1907, ch. 46, § 1; C.L. 1907,
§ 1241; C.L. 1917, § 3320; R.S. 1933, 44-0-1; L.

15-1-4. Interesi on judg_m ents. Any judgment rendered on a lawful co'
shall conform thereto and. shall pear the interest agreed upon by the parti
shall be spe,cified in the judgment;, other judgments shall bear interest at the
of eight ftei' eeM 12% per annum.
··

•

History: L. 1907, .ch. .46, § 11; C.L. 1907,
§ 1241X9; C.L. 1917, § 3330; R.S. 1933 & C.
1943, 44-0-4; L. 1981, ch. 73, § 2.
Lato payment of prope rty division in
divorce action.
This section does not prohibit a district
court from imposing an interest rate of more

•

1935, ch. 42, § 1; C. 1943, 44-0-1; L. I
73, § 1.

than eight percent for late payment o'
ordered paid in a property division
divorce action where the property d'
award is reasonable and equit;ab,\e. ~
Pope (1978)"589 P 2d 752. · ' · ·,\

CHAPTER 2

,I

LEGAL CAPACITY OF CHILDREN
Sect ion
15-2-1. Period of minority.

•

•

•
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judgment against owner bee
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a bond to O ol'/
mater1al man, materialman
Protect. ·
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.
was ent·· ,, t
Pre!u
gment interest from the
,!\lect'
notice to the owner for dem d date cif r·
an of
1
an d not from t he due date i d"1 Payll\e
invoice, where at time t he~ ~ate~ on ~~ ,credit was being extended to t~/ Wfls due' ·
by the material man for a Ire d contracl(i'
debts. Triple I Supply, Inc. v
Past-d/
Inc. (1982) 652 P 2d 1298.
. Unset naile

\Y

Substantia l performance.

Performance bond,
This section provides no authori~ ·
~ward at~orney fees to the prevailin y to
m an action between owners. and su~eiarty
a performance bond not required b Y ~n
chapter. Lignell v. Berg (1979) 593 p 2d~~~is

CONTRACTS AND OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL
\,

.'•·@hapter
.
..
5-1. Interest.
: i\9-Z.
Legal capacity of children.
_ _ Prompt Paymen_t Act._ .
56
7. Registered Public Obhgat1ons Act.

• !· ~

D~ctrine of substantial perfor
'
appl!cabl,e__t o this bond/ng statut~-ance is
heatmg subcontract was sulis"ta t" • Where
p leted on December 23 1968 f n ia1ly colJt.
•
. ·
. •
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action on bond. Carlisle v. Cox (1973 ) f1hng
29. U2d
136, 506 -P 2d 60.
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TITLE 15

1

tf
,!
••~j

CH.A PTER l
INTEREST
Section
.1.1. Interest rates - Legal rate - Contr acted rate.
15
15.J.4. Interest on judgments.

"15•1·1. Interest .rates - Legal rate - Contracted rate. ill Except when parti~s to a lawful contract agree on !!. specified rate Qf interest, the legal rate of inter~ffcir-th.e loan or forbearance .of any money, goods, or (thlngs] chose in action
shall be 10% per annum. [~- 1Wtlti-ng !let'etfl eentained shall] Nothing in this section ~ be [se] construed [ftS] to in any way affect any penalty or interest charge
wiifch by law applies to delinquent or other taxes or to any contract or obligations
made before [the 14th dey ef] May 14, 1981.
{g! The parties to 2. lawful contract may agree upon .!!!!_Y rate 2f interest for
the loan QI forbearance Qf .!!!!.Y money, goods, QI chose in action.
·
History: L. 1907, ch. 46, § 1; C.L. 1907,
§ 1241; C.L. 1917, § 3320; R.S. 1933; 44-0-1; L.
1935, ch. 42, § l; C. 1943, 44-0-1; L. 1981, ch.
73, § 1; 1985, ch. 159, § 6.

•

15-1-4. Interest on judgments. Any judgment rendered on a lawful contract
shall conform thereto and shall bear the interest agreed upon by the parties, which

shall be specified in the judgment; other judgments shall bear interest at the rate
of 12% per annum.
History: L. 1907, ch. 46, § 11; C.L. 1907,
§1241X9; C.L. 1917, § 3330; R.S. 1933 & C.
1943, 44-0-4; L. 1981, ch. 73," § 2.

•

Compiler's-Notes•
The 1981 amendment increased · the interest rate from 8% to 12% .
Late payment of property divislon in
divorce action.
.
· This section does not prohibit a district
court from imposi ng a n interest rate of more

•
•

•

Compiler's Notes.
· T h e 1981 amendment increased the rate in
the first sentence from 6% to 10%; and
changed the d ate at the end of the last sent ence from 1907 to 1981.

than eight percent for late payment of cash
o·rdered paid in a property division i n a
dJvorce action where the property division
award is reasonable and equitable. Pope v.
P.ope (1978) 589 P 2d 752.
P r ejudgment inte rest.
Prejudgment in terest is inappropriate as
to awards for mental anguish and pun itive
damages. First Secur ity Bank of Utah v.
J .B.J.•Feedyards, Inc. (1982) 653 P 2d 591.
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TITLE 15

•

CONTRACTS AND OBLIGATIONS IN GE~RA.L
Chapter
l. Interest.
7. Registered Public Obligations Act.
8. Utah Rental Purchase Agreement Act.
9. .U_nifonn Athl,e te Agents Act.
10. Service Contracts Act.

CHAPTER 1

•

INTEREST
Section
15-1-4. Interest on judgments.

15-1-1. Interest rates - Contracted rate - Legal rate .

•
•

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Prejudgment interest.
Fire protection district· was liable for 10%
prejudgment interest on invalid lump-sum service fees the district collected because J.h,e fees

were contractual in nature. Highlands at Jordnnelle, LLC v. Wasatch Cnty., 2015 ·U'.l' A'.pp
173, 790 Utah Adv. 24, 2015 Utah App. L~S
177 (Utah Ct. App. 2015).
.
.

15-1-4. Interest on judgments .
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "l!'ederal postjudgment interest rate" means the interest rate established for the federal court system under 28 U.s.c·. Sec. 1961, as amended.
(b) "Final judgment'' means the judgment rendered when all avenues of
appeal have been exhausted.
,
(2)(a) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(b), a judgment rendered
a
lawful contract shall conform to the con.tract and shall bear the interest
agreed upon by the parties, which shail b~ specified in th~ judgment. ' .
·(b) A judgment rendered on a deferred deposit loan subject to Title 7,
Chapter 23, Check Cashing and Deferred Deposit Lending Registration.Act,
shall bear interest.at the rate imposed under Subsection·(3) on an amount
not exceeding the sum ·of:
·
(i) the total of the principal balance of the deferred deposit loan;:,,
(ii) interest,at the rate imposed by the deferred deposit loan agreement
for a period not exceeding 10 weeks as provided in Subsection 7-23-401(4);
(iii) costs; ·
(iv) attorney fees; and
(v) other amounts allowed by law and ordered by the court. ·
(3)(a) Except as otherwise provided by law, all other final civil and criminal
judgments of the district court and justice court shall bear interest at the
federal postjudgment interest rate as of January 1 of each year, plus 2%.
· (b) Except as otherwise provided by law or contract, all ·final judgments

on·

•
•

•
•
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under $10,000 in actions regar<;ling·the.,pi.rrchase of goods and services shall
bear interest at the federaj. ,pcist ju<;lginent_interest rate as Qf January 1 of
each year, plus :10%: ·'
,- ·
(c) The postjudgment interest rate in effect at the time of the judgment
shall remain the interest rate for the duration of the judgment.
(d) The interest on criminal judgments shall be calculated.-on ,tiie .total
amount of the judgment.
·
' · ·
(e) Interest paid on state revenue shall be deposited in accordance with
Section 63A-3-505.
···· · ·
(f) Interest paid on revenue to-ii CQUllty or municipality shall be paid to
the general. fund of the county or··muni~ipality.
.
HISTORY:
L. 1907, ch. 46, § 11; C.L. 1907, § 1241x9;
CL 1917, § 3330; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 44-0-4;
L. 1981, ch. 73, § 2; 1993, ch. 198, § 1; 1999,
ch. 279, § 1; 2000; ch. 149, § 1; 2005, ch. 190,
§ 1; 2008, ch. 96, § 17.; 20JQ, ~l\•10g; § .4; 2911,
ch. 79, § 1; L. 2014, ch. 281, § 1.
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~

I. ··, . •·.

NOTES T9 DECISIONS
•

•

•

a clear date. on which . the-alleged ,b~~ac;lf occurred.and the ii mount of loss co~ld,,b!! c!Jlci,ilated with al:!!urncy. Wardl\)y v. W14"dJey.OoIJ?.,
No .. 2:12-CV-1075 TS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
80463 (D. Ut~ June 5, 2013).
. '. .. _

CHAPTER7
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Section
15-7-4. .Registration system establisheq by issuer.
.

·-:

;

.

i-5~7,4:,'iRe·g isiration· system establi1?hed by issue1:.
:· '. ' •

:

: I ..I,., :_
_. ' ..

. .

.

.

'

.

: • ,•f ; ; -;,.... \\;

I •'

•

f.F.!lju~gm.en_t interest. .., :.
. ,
· i!i.~kruptcy c9urt did qot _ep--.i n Jnt;erpreting
earlier suite court judgment, .whJch. specifitld
interest at 10%, to include prejudgment interest because the state court complaint contained

•

Amendment Notes. The 2014 amendment, effective May 13,
2014, added (l)(b) and (3)(b); substitutedr"all
other final civil" for "other civil" in (3Xa); ai'i°d
made related changes.

.i . .

I

•

,

, .,•

•

I \ , : ,

:. . ,; ....
• I,: .

.

. .~

(:l,)(a) Each issue.:r: :is ~ul)qorjzed .to , establish an:d· ll).aintain a system of
. i:egistr.ation.wit~ .respect tt.O ,ead:i._qbligatio:a it i/:is.u.es. ·.
· . (b) The system,desccibed in ,this Subse.c tion (1.) may either,be: .-.
(i) a system pursuant to which only certificated; registered,.,,public
obligations are issued;, ·, · :
. · ,,
·1-, .• -(ii) ·a ·system pursuant to .which ,.only uncertific'ated registered public
obligations a:i:e-issued;cor- ·.:•·
,. , ,.
(iii) a system pursuant to which both certificated and uncertificated
registered public obligations are issued.
(c) The,issuex,may amend,, discontinue, and 'reinstitute a system established u.nder this section;-from.tirhe to time, subjectJ to :covenants. : · ,·., .,
· (2). The system. sha,Iil be established, amended, discmntinued, or reinstitute_d,
for the is5iuer-by, ,and shall be. maintained for t he •issuer as provided by,,r-th e
official or ,official ,body. ,.... ,, ·
.·

•
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